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The  dominant  Law  and  Economics  paradigm  regarding  “Intellectual 
Property” – a vehicle or an obstacle for innovation, growth and progress? 
 




The term “intellectual property” is a relatively a modern term, first used in its 
current  meaning  when  the  UN  established  the  World  Intellectual  Property 
Organization  (WIPO)  in  1967.  Beforehand  laws  around  the  world  protected 
various  aspects  of  informational  goods  –  inventions  and  creations  -  using 
separate legal concepts, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, which were 
not perceived as property rights.  This linguistic aspect is by no means anecdotal 
or marginal as it can be argued that the term “intellectual property” constituted 
its  contemporary  meaning  including  the  economic  analysis  of  informational 
goods  and  services,  as  can  be  demonstrated  by  the  recent  call  to  treat  trade 
secrets  not  as  a  contractual  agreement  but  as  intellectual  property  (Epstein, 
2005).  
 
Intellectual Property has become a serious matter. Some estimates conclude that 
the current value of intellectual property significantly outweighs the value of 
physical  property  -  land,  tangibles  and  intangibles  together  (Idris,  2004).  A 
growing  percentage  of  the  GDP  in  industrial  countries  is  comprised  now  of 
informational goods such as software, movies, music, drugs and databases.1 The 
scope of IP protection has of course significant effect on this economic value and 
the laws regulating intellectual property in the information age are perceived as a 
key for economic growth. Intellectual property law, therefore, has become of 
                                                             
1 According to Idris (2004, Ch. 3) while In 1982, some 62 percent of corporate assets in the 
United States were physical assets, by 2000, that figure had shrunk to a mere 30 percent. Others 
assert that the value of IP in corporations of the industrialized countries amounts to more than two 
thirds of their total value (Greene, 2001) According to Shapiro & Hassett (2005) the value of IP in 
the United States in 2005 is estimated at 5 trillion US Dollars, which stands for roughly 50% of 
U.S. GDP.     2 
immense importance. It has seen in the last decade the most significant changes 
since its birth following the invention of printing. The field of IP law became 
also  an  important  battleground  for  interest  groups,  politicians  and  different 
voices in civil society (e.g. Lessig, 2004). The borderless nature of informational 
goods  highlights  also  national  interests,  which  are  reflected  in 
internationalization  of  legal  arrangements  and  institutions  in  this  field  and  in 
growing controversies among nations and governments. 
 
This  paper  focuses  on  the  normative  analysis  of  IP  rights  and  criticizes  the 
implicit shift in economic analysis of IP from the incentives paradigm, which is 
founded upon the public good analysis of neo-classical micro-economic theory, 
to the new propriety paradigm, which is intellectually founded upon the tragedy 
of the commons literature. It further criticizes the dominant contemporary Law 
and Economics writings in this field as pre-assuming information to be an object 
of property, overlooking its fundamental differences from physical property and 
thus focusing on its management and maximization of value for its “owners” 
rather than on its initial justifications and its social value and contribution to 
innovation, growth and progress. 
 
Section  1  will  provide  a  brief  general  survey  of  the  normative  sources  of 
intellectual  property  rights;  Section  2  will  explain  the  main  features  of  the 
incentives framework of normative Law and Economics and will elaborate on 
several points of critique; Section 3 will focus on the tragedy of the commons 
framework and will examine critically the shift to the propriety model; Section 4 
will conclude and provide some tentative thoughts on the notion of property in 
light of the information revolution. 
 
1. THE NORMATIVE SOURCES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 
   3 
There  are  two  grand  foundations  for  normative  analysis  or  justification  of 
intellectual property rights: deontological foundation and teleological one. The 
former can characterize the dominant origin of IP legal discourse in the Civil 
Law world (Continental Europe), while consequential thinking is perceived to be 
the dominant foundation of IP law in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Within 
each of these domains one can identify two major theories of IP (Fisher, 2001). 
 
The  deontological-based  theories  include  natural  law  and  natural  rights 
justifications  of  IP.  This  paradigm  is  mostly  outside  the  scope  of  Law  and 
Economics, as it judges whether a law, decision or action is right or wrong on the 
bases of its intrinsic moral value without regard to its consequences in terms of 
subjective individual or collective utilities or preferences. A natural law Lockean 
type justification to property rights, including IP rights, asserts that every person 
has a natural right to owe his or her self-labored creations – whether they are 
physical or intellectual. This right cannot be compromised even if allocating such 
a right decreases the social welfare or utility, hinders a just distribution and alike. 
The  same  applies  to  the  Kant-Hegel  self-fulfilling  or  self-flourishing 
justifications for the protection of IP, which are also deontological in their nature 
and thus outside the realm of Law and Economics. Applying these frameworks 
denote  property  rights  in  information  for  unlimited  time,  but  only  for  those 
inventions or creations which are the result of significant individual intellectual 
work, and thus they do not correspond to positive law. 
 
Teleological  justifications  can  be  analyzed  within  the  Law  and  Economics 
discourse. Such is the Utilitarian theory of IP and its derivatives, but also the 
classical  Republican  one.  The  Utilitarian  foundation  of  IP  and  its  off  springs 
justify intellectual property rights as far as granting such rights maximizes social 
utility or social welfare or individual preferences, or social wealth, or economic 
efficiency.  There are significant differences between each of these consequential 
goals, which will be partly addressed below, but all of them can be analyzed 
under the methodology of economics. The incentives theory is maybe the most   4 
common framework to analyze IP law within this paradigm. However, traditional 
Law and Economics models are geared to prescribe static efficiency – the optimal 
allocation of existing resources under an assumed fixed level of technology, while 
the major role of informational products is to increase existing resources and to 
advance  technology,  i.e.  they  are  geared  to  achieve  dynamic  efficiency  – 
innovation,  growth  and  progress.    We  will  have  to  relate  to  this  significant 
difference in the following sections. 
 
A Republican theory of IP might be considered as the most complex one.  The 
Republican goal in this context is to achieve an attractive and just society and 
culture (Fisher, 2001), promoting “discursive foundations for democratic culture 
and  civic  association”  (Netanel,  1996).  I  argued  elsewhere  (Elkin-Koren  and 
Salzberger, 2005) that Republican thinking is not outside the scope of Law and 
Economics,  but  perhaps  its  most  interesting  challenge.    This  paper  does  not 
attempt to focus on Republican thinking, but for the sake of a complete theoretical 
map,  and  indeed  as  a  criticism  of  the  current  dominant  direction  of  Law  and 
Economics  scholarship  in  this  field,  it  might  be  beneficial  to  point  the  main 
argument in this context: From a Law and Economics perspective the primary 
difference between the classical Utilitarian (and derivative) justifications and the 
Republican one lies with the assumptions regarding individual preferences. While 
the Utilitarian approaches view individual preferences as given, or exogenous to 
the collective decision-making process, or to the market process, or to economic 
analysis, the Republican approach views individual preferences as endogenous to 
the analysis, i.e. that the legal arrangements themselves, as well as institutions and 
procedures, can affect the basic individual preferences in a way that will make 
them  more  other-regarding  or  co-operative,  allowing  the  extension  of  the 
collective utility frontiers.  
 
These very general and philosophical observations are important, for example, in 
the context of the heated debate between the pro-propertization advocates and the   5 
defenders of the public domain.  The concept of the public domain exists beyond 
the specific IP context and is part of a Republican discourse.  The public domain, 
like the public sphere is the place in which individuals meet each other, interact, 
exchange views and information and attempt to influence each other’s opinions 
and  preferences.    Thus,  under  an  analytical  framework  which  assumes 
endogenous preferences, the preservation and development of such public places 
are beneficial from welfare or utility maximization point of view; once individuals 
change their preferences towards more other-regarding ones the collective is able 
to reach utility or wealth frontiers or other consequential goals, which were not 
available given the initial preferences.  In the context of intellectual property the 
public domain is not only a place of free flow of information and opinions, it is 
also a production mean, and unlike the traditional production means of land, labor 
and to a lesser degree – capital, this public domain is not rivalry or excluding. As 
I wrote elsewhere (Salzberger, 2008) I think that this point regarding individual 
preferences is one of the most important shortcomings of the dominant Law and 
Economics literature in general, and it has far-reaching ramifications for an IP 
theory. Although this is not the focus of the current paper, it is a point to bear in 
mind while reading through it. 
2. THE INCENTIVES PARADIGM  
The incentive theory has been the main Law and Economics paradigm for the 
analysis of intellectual property until the recent shift to the propriety paradigm.2 It 
rests upon two assertions: First, that information is a public good and thus without 
central  intervention  the  investment  in  creative  expressions  and  the  resulting 
cultural  and  technological  progress  will  be  insufficient.  Second,  that  property 
rights  are  the  cheapest  and  most  effective  way  for  society  to  hold  out  these 
incentives (Andersen, 2006). Let us elaborate on these two assertions under a 
critical eye. 
                                                             
2 I use the term “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense, meaning that Law and Economics writings pre-
assume the basic truth of the incentives theory and after the paradigmatic shift pre-assume that 
intellectual creations are objects of property rights.   6 
 
2.1 The Need for Central Intervention 
 
Economic theory has always been skeptical of government intervention in the 
market. Free and open markets, it has been thought, will function efficiently if not 
interrupted by government actions. Equilibrium of a free and competitive market 
will be utility maximizing, wealth maximizing and Pareto optimal. Therefore, a 
prima facie case for central or public intervention requires a demonstration of a 
failure of the free market (Cooter, 1997). The incentives paradigm views the legal 
regime  of  intellectual  property  as  a  justifiable  central  intervention  to  tackle  a 
public good failure of the market. Once intervention in the market is found to be 
required,  the  materialization  of  utility  maximization,  wealth  maximization  and 
Pareto optimality cannot be all guaranteed and a primer normative goal has to be 
set. This goal is in theory external to the Law and Economics analysis. In practice, 
however,  Law  and  Economics  literature  has  always  been  biased  towards 
efficiency defined in terms of wealth maximization (e.g. Posner’s leading book in 
the field first published in 1972), but, as we mentioned in the previous section, 
this  normative  goal  was  based  on  the  concept  on  static  efficiency  rather  than 
dynamic one. 
 
2.1.1 The Core – Public Goods Analysis 
 
A  pure  public  good  is  a  commodity  with  two  distinctive  characteristics:  non-
excludability  and  non-rivalry.  Non-excludability  occurs  whenever  it  is  either 
impossible to exclude non-payers (free-riders) from using the good or service, or 
the costs for such exclusion are so high that no rational individual or firm will be 
willing  to  produce  the  good  in  the  first  place.  Put  differently,  the  potential 
producer of non-excludable products, knowing that the competitive market price 
of the product will equal the (very low) marginal cost of production and thus 
would not cover the fixed cost, will not produce the product at all. Informational 
goods  are  thought  to  be  non-excludable;  they  are  easy  to  copy.  The  cost  of   7 
creating  multiple  copies  of  a  music  composition,  or  a  piece  of  software,  or 
manufacturing  a  life-saving  drug  and  distributing  it,  are  often  negligible. 
Therefore, in the absence of impediments on copying, the prices of works in a 
competitive market could fall to near zero (Geroski, 2005). The marginal costs of 
exclusion, in lack of central intervention, are often greater than the marginal costs 
of provision, so it is inefficient to spend resources to exclude non-payers. Free 
riding  of  non-payers  reduces  incentives  for  investment  in  generating  new 
information  and  innovations  and  without  government  intervention  information 
and innovations tend to be under-supplied.  
 
Non-rivalry means that the use of such goods by one user does not detract from 
the ability of others to use it. Tangibles, as well as real estate are usually rival 
goods, meaning that their usage by one person precludes others from using them. 
Informational goods are usually non-rival and therefore, once produced, it is in 
the general interest that they will be used by as many as possible. Information is 
not consumed by its usage; it cannot be used-up. Consumption of informational 
works does not exhaust the resource. The use of an idea, the reading of a text, or 
the implementation of a mathematical theory or a drug formula by one person 
does not prevent others from using it simultaneously or subsequently.3 
 
The non-rivalrous nature of informational goods means that there is no social loss 
associated with their usage, since no one else is deprived of that use. Therefore 
there is no need to allocate informational resources to the most efficient user. 
Quite  the  contrary;  everyone  can  use  informational  goods  simultaneously. 
Moreover, the use of informational goods is beneficial on top of the immediate 
value for the user, in that it engages readers, viewers and other users in a mutual 
productive experience. The consumption of information in this sense is nurturing 
the  human  capital  that  could  then  contribute  to  the  production  of  more 
                                                             
3 The tangible in which works are embodied, such as printed books and plastic CDs or pills, are 
not pubic goods. They would be subject to the rivalry suffered by other scarce resources. But this 
scarcity does not apply to the information contained in them, which is the prime source of their 
value.   8 
information.  In economic terminology the consumption of informational goods, 
whether  this  is  a  cultural  product,  software  or  medication,  creates  positive 
externalities. Consequently, once these goods are created there is a benefit in their 
widest possible usage, in order to maximize welfare in society and as a basis for 
further innovation and creation.  
 
While  the  non-excludability  character  of  informational  goods  provides  the 
economic  rationale  for  central  intervention  (such  as  IPR)  to  incentivize  their 
creation, the non-rivalry nature of these goods justifies setting limits on the bundle 
of  rights,  in  scope  and  duration,  in  order  to  enable  their  usage  by  many  as 
possible, generating greater collective welfare.4 Yet, even if we grant those rights 
for a limited period their owners enjoy monopolistic powers; they can set the price 
as they please. Owners will usually set the price that maximizes their profits, 
rather than a price, which equals their marginal or average cost of production (as 
in competitive markets). This would lead to collective deadweight social losses, 
which are comprised of the potential users who value the informational product 
between its marginal (or average) cost and the monopolistic price, who would not 
purchase it. Consequently, works will be underused. These losses are particularly 
significant  in  the  informational  goods  market,  as  these  goods  are  the  primary 
resource for further creation. IP law attempts to mitigate the later phenomenon 
through limiting not only the duration of rights but also their scope. It protects 
only certain aspects of works (i.e. expressions are protected by copyright but not 
ideas), and recognizes several privileged uses or exceptions (i.e. fair use under 
copyright law). 
 
In  addition  to  the  two  characteristics  of  public  goods  presented  above, 
informational goods have additional distinctive features, which are not shared by 
other public goods and have not received sufficient attention by the Law and 
Economics literature. These features particularly characterize digital informational 
                                                             
4 It is noteworthy that not all forms of IP are analyzed solely in this framework.  The economic 
rationales for trademarks, trade secrets and the right of publicity derive also from other type of 
market failure – lack or asymmetric information, which will not be discussed here.   9 
goods. First, informational goods are mutable and combinatorial. They could be 
modified to suit the user's preferences. Users can easily change a video file and 
remove parts of the movie or even mix different parts. A D.J. can easily mix two 
music files together turning the song to a different song; the same applies to a 
chef’s  recipe.  A  programmer  can  change  codes  in  software  according  to  the 
hardware requirements so it would better function in her work environment and a 
doctor can slightly change a formula of a drug to be better suited for a specific 
patient.  Individual  elements  that  produce  greater  value  to  the  user  can  be 
recombined or sold separately. Second, informational goods are selectable. The 
content can be accessed or copied. For example, one can deep-link an address of a 
website to his website, bypassing the homepage of the original publisher. These 
features make the economic analysis of informational goods more complicated 
than the economic analysis of pure traditional public goods, such as defense or 
health. 
 
2.1.2. Critique – Are Incentives Needed 
 
The  most  important  foundation  of  Law  and  Economics  for  justifying  central 
intervention and thus IPR, as elaborated above, is the need to create incentives for 
the production of information, which is the result of information’s non-excludable 
nature. Skepticism regarding the need for such monetary or centrally provided 
incentives for potential creators has been expressed as early as 1970 by Harvard 
Professor and now US Supreme Court Justice, Steven Breyer. Challenging the 
justification  for  copyright  protection,  Breyer  argued  that  creators  have  several 
advantages over competitors that offset the lower production costs of free riders 
(Breyer, 1970). One such advantage is lead-time. If copies produced by the creator 
reach  the  market  first,  creators  could  sell  original  copies  before  they  are 
confronted with competition by copiers (See also Boldrin & Levine, 2010, Ch. 6).  
   10 
The  need  for  incentives  is  of  course  a  function  of  the  easiness  of  copying. 
Copyright did not exist prior to the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg, 
and likewise it was expanded following the invention of photocopying. One can 
argue, therefore, that since digital technology made copying a lot cheaper, faster 
and more widespread, even if Breyer’s argument was sensible in 1970 it is not so 
anymore. Yet, the prime example discussed by Breyer in 1970 was a new and 
sophisticated technological product at the time - software.5  
 
Let  us  examine  more  carefully  the  general  need  to  provide  incentives  to 
information creators by making several further distinctions, the first of which is 
between  incentives  on  the  individual  creator’s  level  and  incentives  on  the 
organizational or on the institutional level.  
 
The  incentives  paradigm  presumes  that  monetary  incentives  are  a  necessary 
condition  for  inducing  creativity  and  innovation.  This  assumption  involves  an 
empirical claim that is based on shaky grounds - that monetary incentives (derived 
from IPR) would actually induce more creative and innovative activity, or that 
potential authors and inventors will not engage in the appropriate activity unless 
they are promised some monetary profits (Moore, 2003, pp. 610-613). There is 
very limited empirical support for these propositions. There are many benefits that 
people derive from creative activity; there is a natural drive to create, creative 
passion, the need to express oneself and to communicate one's ideas and talents, to 
be  acknowledged  and  to  enjoy  simply  fun,  pleasure  and  satisfaction.  Most 
scientists,  creators  and  inventors  are  motivated  by  the  intrinsic  satisfaction  of 
                                                             
5 Breyer used the software industry to demonstrate the significance of lead-time as a factor that 
can provide economic incentives to potential investors. Thus, he argued, application programs are 
sold,  not  directly  "of  the  shelf,"  but  in  "packages."  Those  packages  contain  "copyrighted 
documentation manuals and a promise that the seller will install the program, iron out its ‘bugs’, 
update it as advances are made, and make adjustments from time to time to keep it compatible 
with others in the machine." A computer user is often buying services and expertise as much as he 
is  buying  a  particular  computer  program.  Thus,  the  copier's  need  to  develop  this  support 
independently would often provide the initial programmer with sufficient lead-time to recover his 
development costs.   11 
investigation and discovery, and also by the recognition of their peers (Martin, 
1998, pp. 46-50) and the general public.  
 
Creativity  provides  socio-psychological  rewards,  which  are  a  function  of  the 
cultural meaning associated with the act of creation. These include the benefits 
from acknowledgment and reputation, but also social relations such as a notion of 
belonging and friendship (Benkler, 2006, pp. 92-99). Poets, sculptures, musicians 
and indeed inventors created monumental works of art and inventions long before 
there was any intellectual property system. Browsing the rich reservoir of users 
generated  content  on  the  Web  nowadays  is  probably  the  best  contemporary 
example of the human longing for creative self-expression. From blogs, through 
home-made video clips posted on YouTube, to pictures shared on Flicker and 
music distributed in MySpace, the Web demonstrates that creative activity is not 
all about money and many of the creators could have earned more money had they 
engaged in another work instead the time they dedicate for creation.  
 
Moreover,  empirical  research  suggests  that  monetary  rewards  can  sometimes 
actually  stifle  creativity.  Studies  that  explore  creative  motivations  distinguish 
between external rewards, such as money, and inherent rewards, such as pleasure, 
curiosity and positive experiences of autonomy and competence. These studies 
show that intrinsic motivation is often undermined by extrinsic rewards and that 
people may become less creative when they are offered monetary rewards (Deci et 
al.,  1999;  Lawrence,  2004,  Ariely  et  al.,  2009).  Likewise,  the  Cognitive 
Evaluation Theory (CET) focuses on the negative effects of monetary rewards and 
predicts that rewards given for achievements could sometimes reduce the sense of 
autonomy of the creators (Cameronat et al., 2005). Such rewards might actually 
reduce the quality of work (Kohn, 1999, pp 136-138) or shift its direction. It has 
also  been  suggested  that  the  exclusive  rights  accorded  through  intellectual 
property laws provide the creator with a control over the usage of her creation that 
can stifle their own future creativity (Lessig, 2001, p. 236; Vaidhyanathan, 2001).    12 
 
So far we focused on the incentives of the individual creator operating alone to 
invent  or  create.  But  most  creative  activities  nowadays  are  conducted  within 
organizations – commercial or public institutions. There is a significant difference 
between  the  motivation  of  individual  creators,  and  those  of  publishers  and 
producers of content or knowledge-based products, or universities and research 
institutes. There are also differences between the incentives of these organizations 
and those of the individuals working there and between individual creators who 
do not work within organizations and those who are employees of the information 
industries. Although copyright discourse has always emphasized authors’ rights, 
copyright  law,  in  fact,  serves  the  needs  of  the  content  industry.  It  provides  a 
mechanism for securing monetary incentives to those who invest in the creative 
process, in the form of a set of exclusive rights to exploit the work. In the absence 
of sufficient return on investment it would be difficult to attract sufficient funds to 
be invested in rather expensive and risky enterprises such as the production of 
content or R&D in commercial enterprises. Innovation is risky since inherently 
there is a high level of uncertainty regarding its success. Underinvestment, so the 
argument goes, will consequently lead to undersupply of resources and, thus, to 
less creative works and discoveries, which are beneficial to society.  While a 
passionate poet is likely to write her poetry even if she lacks financial incentives, 
the book and music publishing industries would not necessarily publish her work 
and, in general, undersupply works, without the monetary incentives to do that. 
Without these industries, passionate creators would be unable to disseminate their 
artifacts to the public. Likewise, patent rights operate in the same manner with 
regard to inventions and technological advancements. 
 
The institutional component complicates the simple and naïve picture portrayed 
so far. Research in a university or a public research institute is not the same vis-à-
vis incentives to innovate as research in a commercial firm. Firms differ from 
each other in their organizational structures and profit distribution. The financial   13 
agreements  with  employees  differ  and  might  be  crucial  for  the  incentives  to 
innovate on both the organization and the individual levels. Within organizations, 
for example, monetary rewards could be a dangerous motivator if improperly or 
inequitably managed. Studies have shown that employees are often lacking the 
proper motivation if they are "bought out" for limited rewards (Lawrence, 2004).  
 
Industries  producing  mass  content  are  relatively  new  and  were  significantly 
strengthened during the twentieth century (Benjamin, 1968, pp. 217-252). This 
model involves the production of a single prototype organized by firms and the 
distribution  of  mass  copies  to  consumers.  It  is  arguable  that  this  mode  of 
production  was  largely  facilitated  by  the  intellectual  property  regime  itself. 
However, one can question the contribution of this content industry in comparison 
to the contribution of old style individual creators working alone, for example in 
music, in visual arts and in other fields.  Moreover, public research institutions 
and universities as opposed to private firms are funded by the government or the 
public and this funding itself might be sufficient to overcome the public good 
nature of its products, so a question arises as whether allowing these institutions 
also the benefits of IPR is justified.  
 
The questions raised here are relevant today more than ever due to the new digital 
environment, which significantly reduces the cost of communicating and sharing 
works,  enabling  new  modes  of  production  and  distribution  of  information 
(Benkler,  2002;  Litman,  2004).  This  new  environment  might  replace  the  20
th 
century content industry and further questions the need for monetary incentives in 
the  form  of  IPR.  Digital  networks  introduced  new  modes  of  production  and 
distribution  of  information.  In  the  area  of  software  development,  for  instance, 
Linux  was  created  by  a  community  of  users  who  volunteered  to  make  a 
contribution  to  a  grand  project.  Open  source  projects,  such  as  Linux,  are 
comprised of the contributions of thousands of unorganized developers, located in 
different places around the globe, who voluntarily contribute to a common project   14 
without direct monetary compensation.6 The development of Free Software stands 
in  sharp  contrast  to  Microsoft  Windows,  which  was  written  by  employees  of 
Microsoft and is protected by copyright, patent and trademark laws, prohibiting 
unauthorized copying, redistribution and modification of the software.  
 
But software is by no means the only example of the new mode of production. 
Other  online  phenomena  have  similar  attributes.  Compare,  for  instance,  the 
production  of  news  by  corporate  employees  of  CNN,  and  news  generated  by 
subscribers of newsgroups, in which individuals contribute news items that are 
rated by their peers over time for credibility and reliability; or the well-established 
encyclopedias  versus  Wikipedia,  which  is  constructed  on  individual  efforts  of 
many who do not operate for any monetary incentives. A recent online trend is the 
one of weblogs and video sharing. People all around the world are uploading their 
own private contents to the web in the form of video files, audio files or even 
online  diaries.  The  users  export  themselves  to  the  world  and  produce  content 
without asking (and in most cases without thinking) about intellectual property 
issues.  
 
As  contended  by  Benkler  (2002a),  the  digital  network  environment  opens  up 
opportunities for new modes of production and distribution of information. The 
information economy, he argues, introduces a new radically decentralized type of 
production mode, which is the commons-based peer-production of information. 
These social and economic phenomena reflect a non-proprietary regime where 
content is developed through collaborative efforts without any claim for exclusive 
rights in it. Production of information, knowledge and culture, Benkler maintains, 
no longer requires management by the hierarchy of firms, or the price signals of 
the market. When projects are modular in the sense that they can be divided into 
                                                             
6 GNU/Linux operating system and Apache server software, which were developed in a common 
non-proprietary regime, are increasingly gaining popularity and are considered more stable then 
comparable commercial programs (Gillen, Kusnetzky and Mclarnon, 2003). Linux runs on about 
29 million machines (according to LinuxCounterSite ,2005) and the number increases rapidly.   15 
small  independently  produced  components,  they  can  rely  on  non-monetary 
motivations of individuals. Large-scale collaborations will be possible as long as 
diverse motivations can be pooled and merged into a single effort. The low cost of 
communicating  and  processing  information  makes  such  coordination  and 
integration cost-effective in a way that was unavailable before. The development 
of such powerful informational products, which are non-rival and non-excludable, 
without  any  apparent  monetary  compensation  and  any  guaranteed  return  for 
financial investment, is challenging the incentives paradigm and its basic premise 
–  the  need  for  monetary  incentives  for  informational,  technological  and 
intellectual creations.  
 
From  an  economic  analysis  perspective  the  new  mode  of  production  can  be 
analyzed in two frameworks. The First is the Coasian theory of the firm (1937), 
which views the creation of the firm as a substitute to nexus of contracts in the 
market, where the transaction costs involved in the hierarchical nature of a firm 
are lower than the costs of transacting within markets. The new technological 
frontiers  decrease  these  transaction  costs  significantly  and  thus  shift  back 
productive activity from firms to the market.  The second economic framework 
for the analysis of this new mode of production is the division between work and 
leisure. The atomization of efforts can shift activities that were regarded in the 
“old” world as work, to activities that are regarded by individuals in the “new” 
world  as  leisure  (Elkin  Koren  and  Salzberger,  2005,  pp.  62-63).  Both  these 
frameworks point at a decreasing need for central intervention in order to provide 
monetary incentives to create. 
 
The new world does not only enable new modes of production; it also enables 
new  modes  of  dissemination  and  distribution.  Online  dissemination  of 
informational  works  of  all  sorts  is  made  directly  by  individuals,  using  their 
personal computers to convey their ideas or share informational works with other 
individuals  using  the  same  protocols.  Users  of  Gnutella-based  file-sharing   16 
systems are capable of making files available for downloading by other users, by 
simply  placing  files  at  a  designated  directory  on  their  personal  computers. 
Electronic delivery of information involves low costs and does not require any 
large investment in the production of copies and the establishment of distribution 
channels. Digital networks diminish the role of some traditional intermediaries, 
such  as  the  recording  or  publishing  industries,  while  introducing  new 
intermediaries,  such  as  search  engines  or  P2P  software.  In  this  environment 
various forms of intellectual property, such as copyright law, do not promote but 
actually  create  obstacles  to  the  development  of  such  alternative  modes  of 
production and distribution. The new technological possibilities have a significant 
effect  also  on  the  distribution  of  physical  products  and  services,  including  of 
course information-based products such as drugs, which means that re-thinking of 
traditional laws have to be conducted from this perspective not only with regard to 
copyright protected materials but also in the patent protection realm. 
 
Independently from the new production and distribution modes, the new digital 
environment has also a significant bearing on the non-excludability character of 
informational goods, which is a prime source of the Law and Economic incentives 
paradigm. New technologies not only enable easier and cheaper copying but also 
enable much easier and cheaper exclusion. The Internet enhances the ability to 
exclude  and  control  the  distribution  of  information  to  the  extent  that  makes 
significant fractions of it no longer a public good.  The nature of information in 
the Internet and also in other digital platforms such as DVDs, computer games, 
electronic  books  and  alike  allows  the  application  of  cost-effective  self-help 
technical  measures  to  control  its  consumption  and  use.    Such  means  allow 
information that used to be non-excludable in the past to be excludable today.  
Indeed, the creation of digital copies involves very low cost; yet distribution of 
copies protected by IPR is no longer the sole way of generating profits.  Technical 
ways to prevent copying and to charge a fee for it are widely more available. In 
addition,  the  new  digital  environment  facilitates  a  shift  from  selling  copies  to 
charging  for  access.    The  new  technological  frontiers,  for  example,  enable   17 
collecting a fee for access to a website and charging per-use of the information 
provided.    It  allows  temporary  entrance  permits  and  restrictions  of  usage  of 
information  to  on-line  individual  use,  blocking  the  possibilities  of  copying 
information or forwarding it, and more (Bell, 1998; Dam, 1998).  
 
The development of self-help exclusion measures is likely to encourage users to 
develop counter code breaking and hacking tools.  This, in turn, is likely to lead to 
sophistication of the exclusion tools and a continuous technological race between 
the two sorts of devices.  Such a race may divert funds that might otherwise be 
invested in more productive directions. This infertile race might cause resources 
waste  and  may  require  central  intervention,  which  is  very  different  from 
government intervention within the traditional public goods framework.  Here the 
government will not be called upon to provide the public good or the legal means 
to enable its production by private firms.  Central intervention may be required 
here to halt or control the technological race between exclusion tools and their 
counter technologies.7  
 
To  sum-up,  the  extent  to  which  information  today  is  a  public  good  meriting 
incentives in form of central intervention is debatable.  It depends, among other 
factors, on the technological state of the art, which is changing at a rapid pace and 
this pace is not only the cause but also the result of IPR regime.  Traditional Law 
and Economics theory (e.g. Coase’s both key theorems) assumed technology to be 
exogenous  factor  in  market  analysis  and  in  economic  based  justifications  for 
central intervention.  This cannot be the case anymore, and in this sense economic 
theory is under-developed. In other words, economics have not produced yet a 
general, comprehensive and agreed-upon theory focusing on dynamic efficiency 
                                                             
7 The American DMCA legislation provides an example how the combination of traditional IPR 
rationale  with  regulation  of  a  technological  race  between  exclusion  means  and  anti-exclusion 
means should not be conducted.  This legislation includes a prohibition on anti- circumvention 
activities.  However, when interpreted by the courts this clause was extended to prohibition of 
anti-circumvention  of  non-protected  IPR  activity  (Lexmark  International  Inc.  387  F.3d  522; 
Chamberlain Group Inc., 381 F.3d 1178), further restricting the availability of information.   18 
rather than static efficiency. Consequently, the public good analysis may not be 
very conclusive in determining when government intervention is necessary and to 
what extent, and it is even possible that incentives in the form of contemporary IP 
laws in fact achieve the opposite goal - suppressing innovation and creation. The 
fact that the general principles of copyright law, patent law and other forms of IP 
have not been revisited in light of these technological developments (and, in fact, 
in  some  fields,  notably  copyright,  protection  was  actually  amplified  in  recent 
years)  and  that  Law  and  Economics  analysis  has  not  recommended  a  shift  of 
balance (in terms of duration of protection, exceptions etc.) ought to raise some 
question-marks.  These observations and the indeterminacy of economic analysis 
as to the right amount of incentives needed to overcome the traditional public 
goods  problem  might  be  a  possible  explanation  for  the  shift  of  the  Law  and 
Economics literature to the propriety paradigm of IP.  
  
2.2 Central Intervention in Form of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
So  far  we  questioned  the  need  for  monetary  incentives  in  order  to  generate 
creation and innovation.  In this section, under the assumption that incentives are 
needed, we will discuss different forms of incentives and examine the second 
premise  of  the  Law  and  Economics  incentives  model  according  to  which 
intellectual property rights are the optimal method of central intervention (Moore, 
2003, pp. 610-613). Unlike the deontological rationales for IP, which focus on the 
natural right to be granted ownership on self created ideas and thus have a first 
order  justification  in  favor  of  IP  rights,  the  starting  point  of  the  incentives 
paradigm  is  a  market  failure  of  public  goods.    The  Law  and  Economic 
justification for IP rights is, therefore, of a second order nature.  In other words, 
one thing is to examine whether such a market failure does exist; a separate issue 
is the desirable remedy to correct this failure.   
 
2.2.1 Different Legal Forms of incentives   19 
 
Central intervention to correct a public good failure in the market of informational 
goods can take other forms than intellectual property rights. Central production of 
information and ideas, direct sponsoring of these activities in the form of research 
institutions and universities and cultural institutions, a prize system and liability or 
other sort of legal rights (not necessarily propriety) are alternative solutions.8  This 
seems to be a trivial point, but on a closer look of the existing literature it is not so.  
Each  of  these  remedies  has  advantages  and  disadvantages.  For  example,  while 
direct government production or funding of creation has the dangers of hidden or 
explicit  political  agendas  or,  more  broadly,  a  threat  from  the  view  point  of 
democratic  and  liberal  values,  direct  subsidies  of  government  for  creation 
activities, instead of granting IP rights, will bring to a greater public domain, which 
enhances  the  sources  for  future  creations  and  can  better  contribute  to  future 
development and growth. IP rights have the danger of limiting production means 
and  can  create  a  backfiring  effect,  constraining  the  frontiers  of  intellectual 
production. In addition, one can argue that IPR are no less dangerous from liberal 
and  democratic  perspectives  as  they  are  enhancing  the  powers  of  mega 
corporations that replace democratically elected officials. 
 
It seems that economists prefer IP rights to government own creation activities or 
subsidies, because the former is thought to facilitate trade and therefore the value 
of the informational goods will be determined by market forces.  If no free market 
activity in ideas and creations will take place, how will we be able to determine 
how  much  creation  to  finance?  How  many  subsidies  to  grant  and  to  whom?  
                                                             
8 Abramowicz (2004, p. 68) proposed an incentive mechanism in the format of a patent prize 
system by considering a variety of design issues, such as delayed vs. immediate payouts, funds vs. 
open-ended  program,  and  tradable  vs.  non-tradable  rewards.  Recently,  David  Leonhardt,  a 
journalist in the New York Times, published an article calling for the comeback of prizes as a 
reward for innovation (Leonhardt, 2007). He reminds us that in the 18
th century prizes were a 
common way to reward innovation but nowadays they are replaced by grants that reward money 
upfront. The worthless merit of the grants is that they are easier to be monitored by government 
bureaucrats. Leonhardt argues that grants are a failure and his bold example is that governments 
all  around  the  world  have  handed  grants  and  subsidies  for  finding  various  alternative  energy 
source but nobody ever found such a source. Leonhardt suggests a resort to the prize system   20 
However, this is not such a trivial issue.  First, in order for IP to be traded in 
competitive markets there is a need for an initial central intervention to define 
those rights in the first place – scope, duration etc. This definition itself is not a 
result of free market activity, and of course it will have a decisive impact on the 
future market outcome regarding the actual objects of the rights. Second, IP regime 
creates monopolistic powers and thus the real market value of protected creations 
cannot be detected by the sheer operation of the market.  Third, giving inventors 
control  over  all  the  positive  externalities  associated  with  their  inventions 
encompasses control over improvements and new uses that might be made out of 
their works. As a result, there will be fewer incentives for future improvers to 
invest in developing the first generation technology, i.e., the original invention. 
Competition on improving the first generation technology will be stifled (Lemley, 
2005, pp. 1060-1062). 
 
Furthermore,  granting  subsidies  for  creation  can  be  conducted  on  the  bases  of 
competitive  variables,  and  the  resulting  products  and  services  will  be  traded 
competitively in markets and therefore will generate much more competition than 
the trade in IP protected products and services, which are monopolized by their 
holders. Indeed, most basic research is funded with no direct connection to its 
market value and patents usually do not cover it.  Nevertheless, we are witnessing 
in recent decades increasing attempts by research institutions to commodify their 
research products, which of course brings to the shrinkage of the public domain, as 
well as to motivating basic research to more immediate practical directions. As will 
be explained below, this sort of patents’ extension cannot be justified easily by 
candid economic analysis. 
 
It is important to emphasize that from a Law and Economics perspective not only 
that an ex-ante grant and ex-post prize systems are substitutes to each other, they 
are both substitutes to an IP regime and to central production.  In other words, 
incentives to invent and create can be formed by either an IP regime or by a grant   21 
or prize system, and to have both regimes is inefficient, or at least the scope of IP 
rights to those who can enjoy prizes and grants should be different from the scope 
of IP rights for those who are not entitled to compete for them.  This point is 
different from the question whether it is justified at all to provide incentives for 
government funded research institutions, which might not suffer from the public 
good failure of the market in the first place. The fact that universities rank very 
high in the statistics of patent applications and patent revenues is inconsistent with 
economic  analysis.  Government  funded  research  and  information  production 
should not enjoy the same IP protection as private enterprises – individuals or 
firms,  because  it  enjoyed  already  monetary  incentives  by  direct  government 
funding.  
 
Liability rules are another possible remedy to the public goods market failure in 
information and ideas. Calabresi and Melamed (1972) highlighted the distinction 
between the question whether to allocate an entitlement and to whom, and the 
separate question as to the desirable method of its protection. They set up the 
framework  for  choosing  between  property  and  liability  rules.  The  choice, 
according to their model, should depend on the structure of transaction costs. The 
entitlement to your own ideas (either as a first order justification or a second order 
one) can be protected by property rules that prohibit others from making use of 
these ideas, or by liability rules that do not ban such usage, but entitle the creator to 
compensation.  Which  of  the  two  remedies  is  more  desirable?  According  to 
Calabresi and Melamed, property rules should be preferred when negotiation costs 
are  lower  than  the  administrative  costs  of  an  enforcement  agency  or  a  court 
determining the value of the entitlement. In such a case, central intervention ought 
to be minimal, as following the construction of the legal rule, the parties are likely 
to  negotiate  for  the  efficient  end-result,  adhering  to  or  bypassing  the  initial 
allocation of the entitlement. By choosing a property rule, entitlements will change 
hands through a voluntary exchange in the market, where the government’s sole 
function will be to prevent bypassing the market through injunctions and criminal 
law. Liability rules ought to be preferred when the cost of establishing the value of   22 
an initial entitlement by negotiation is higher than that of determining this value by 
an enforcement mechanism. In addition, liability rules might be preferred in order 
to avoid bargaining costs. Lack of information or uncertainty as to the cheapest 
avoider of costs is likely to point us, according to Calabresi and Melamed, in the 
direction  of  liability  rule  as  well.  Liability  rules  involve  additional  central 
intervention by a state organ deciding on the objective value of the entitlement. In 
this case, if the creator has the entitlement, she has the right to be compensated, but 
she cannot prohibit others from using it. 
 
One of the features of information and ideas is the uncertainty as to their value and 
their possible changing value over time. Granting property rights in informational 
goods means that speculators can make fortune by purchasing them for modest 
price and then enjoying huge profits on their future market value. If this is the case, 
property rule does not achieve at all its purpose of providing sufficient (but not 
more than that) incentives for creation. In addition, unlike tangibles, the apparatus 
of registering IP rights (patents, trade marks, designs etc.) encompasses significant 
transaction costs and when registration is not required (copyright) it is sometimes 
very difficult to locate the owners of IP. The costs of trading copyright might be 
very high, as, for example, is illustrated by Lessig (2004, pp. 100-107) when he 
discusses  the  process  of  clearing  rights  before  engaging  in  an  artistic  creation 
which  is  based  on  various  previous  creations.    Informational  goods,  as  we 
mentioned, are non-rivalrous, and this means that granting monopolistic property 
rights in them might be less efficient than enabling everyone to use them, subject 
to appropriate compensation paid ex post. Liability rules can, therefore, become 
interesting alternative to traditional intellectual property rights.  Adopting them 
means an enhancement of competition and the public domain, because those who 
want to use the entitlements protected by them cannot be prohibited; they just have 
to pay for the usage according to competitive market price.9 
                                                             
9 Caroline Nguyen (2004) goes even further in her suggestion for a "Compensated IP Proposal". In 
her opinion the current IP system is over-incentivizing. The circumstances of artificially high 
prices and low supply create significant monopolistic deadweight loss and generate unintended   23 
 
When discussing liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed referred to compensation 
calculated in terms of the losses for the entitlement holder, but their framework of 
analysis can by no means include also compensation on the bases of the gains 
made by the party who used the entitlement.  The legal framework for this possible 
approach  is  unjust  enrichment  or  restitution  law,  which  may  suit  better  the 
application of their model to the analysis of entitlements in information (Elkin 
Koren  and  Salzberger,  2000).  Such  a  regime,  in  which  the  entitlement  holder 
would not be entitled to prevent usage by others but rather will be entitled to the 
gains made by others using the entitlement, eliminates the monopolistic effects of 
IPR, enables much wider usage of the information and thus might be more efficient 
than the traditional regime of IP. Since in any case the enforcement of IPR through 
legal proceedings is much more costly than the enforcement of property rights in 
tangibles  and  real  estate,  the  additional  costs  in  administrating  such  alternative 
regime, if any, might be negligible in relation to the gains from such a system. 
 
2.2.2 Incentives by IPR – Criticism 
 
Intellectual property laws seek to secure incentives by providing creators with a 
set of legal rights of property, which allow the creators to trade their works and 
inventions in the market. This regulatory scheme creates several difficulties from 
Law and Economics own perspective.  
 
First, securing incentives by enabling exclusion leads to a paradox (Lunney, 1996, 
pp. 556-570). The incentives paradigm assumes that granting property rights will 
                                                             
consequences that undermine social progress. Nguyen’s suggestion of "Compensated IP Proposal", 
in contrast, “retains financial incentives for producers but lowers them to a merely sufficient level, 
transferring much producer surplus to consumers. The Compensated IP Proposal contains two 
components:  creators  of  intellectual p r o d u c t s  r e c e i v e  c o s t -based  compensation  from  the 
government for their products and in exchange their products immediately are granted to society 
for unrestricted use. Inventors retain all public credit and recognition for their work. This system 
would alleviate desert-based objections to current IP practices while satisfying utilitarian calls for 
financial incentives to encourage research and development".    24 
induce the production of the most useful and social beneficial inventions. Less 
crucial  creations  and  inventions  will  have  appropriate  substitute  products  and 
therefore IP rights for these will not create a monopolistic power and their owners 
will have to sell them at a competitive market price range. However, the most 
useful inventions, which do not have substitutions, have the pinnacle justification 
for a broad access. The more utility is driven from any particular invention, the 
stronger the need to make it accessible to as many users as possible in order to 
maximize social welfare. This is a direct consequence of the non-rivalry nature of 
intellectual  creations.  Granting  intellectual  property  rights  to  extremely  useful 
inventions such as critical drugs in order to stimulate their production generates a 
monopoly power to the right holders that most likely will limit access to those 
critical inventions for which we sought to maximize access. In other words, those 
creations that have substitutes will be priced at near free economic market price, 
thus IP protection is not needed for their creation in the first place or will not make 
a  real  difference.  Granting  IP  rights  to  those  creations  that  are  really  path 
breaking, unique and essential will generate monopolistic power and thus these 
creations will not get to the wide population who is in real need for them. Hence 
we have a paradox. 
 
Consider incentives in the pharmaceutical industry: When a company invests to 
develop a new drug for headaches it will be one drug among many in the market 
and thus despite the property rights granted to the producer it will not be able to 
set its price much above the competitive market price.  It will thus be broadly 
available  for  use  by  many.  In  contrast,  the  AIDS  Health  crisis  requires  large 
investments in research and development of new cure. Once a medicine becomes 
available social welfare maximization would mandate making it accessible to as 
many infected patients as possible. If the drug, however, is the property of its 
inventors  (or  the  investors)  and  does  not  have  substitutes,  it  will  be  sold  at  a 
monopoly price, and only a few will be able to purchase it. This is the reason for 
the objection raised by global health activists to patent legislation that prevents the 
production of life-saving drugs at marginal cost. Yet, the pharmaceutical industry   25 
argues that without patents AIDS drugs would have not been invented at all. If 
AIDS drugs or any other drugs for fatal diseases will not receive the full patent 
protection,  the  industry  argues,  it  would  lack  sufficient  incentives  to  invest  in 
developing those drugs, and R&D efforts would be diverted into more promising 
markets, such as anti-aging drugs.10 This is exactly a two sword-edges argument: 
incentives by IPR will direct R&D into directions of profit maximization. Decease 
of the rich will attract much more investment and efforts than decease of the poor.   
 
From  an  economic  analysis  perspective,  the  AIDS  example  raises  further 
conceptual  and  theoretical  problems.    When  legislation  is  geared  to  maximize 
wealth (or welfare or utility) by the right balance between creating incentives to 
overcome non-excludability and restricting them due to non-rivalry, what should 
be  the  territorial  unit  for  such  maximization?    If  maximization  of  wealth  is 
                                                             
10 The most notable example for this conflict over AIDS drugs occurred in South Africa, which 
has one of the highest percent of HIV patients in the world. Six million South Africans, one in 
eight, are HIV positive, with 1,500 new cases reported every day, and it is one of the poorest 
populations in the world where the average annual income in South Africa is $2,600 (Scherrer, 
1999). While the patented drugs, which were produced in South Africa, costs almost 3$ per patient 
per day, a generic version of the drug, produced in Brazil, costs only 1.55% of this price per 
patient per day (Lewis, 2002). In 1997, the South African government of Nelson Mandela passed 
The Medicines and Related Substance Control Amendment Act. The purpose of the act was to 
enable the government to make the HIV drugs treatment more affordable by allowing Parallel 
importation  of  patented  drugs  from  countries  where  the  drug  company  sells  the  drugs  more 
cheaply, and by permitting the use of generic version of the HIV drugs treatment as a substitute for 
the  patented  drugs.  South  Africa  defended  this  legislation  by  relying  on  its  government’s 
obligations under its own constitution to ensure a right of access to health care, and its obligations 
under international human rights law to respect, promote and fulfill the fundamental human right 
to the highest attainable standard of health for its people.  
In response to this legislation the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa (PMA) and numerous pharmaceutical companies began in February 1998 legal proceedings 
against the government to invalidate the law, alleging that its provisions were in violation of the 
South African Constitution and of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  The case was scheduled for hearing on 5 March 
2001, and the South Africa government agreed not to implement the legislation until the court case 
is  decided.  In  February  1999,  US  Vice  President  Al  Gore,  commented  in  a  memo  that  the 
protection of pharmaceutical patents should be "a central focus" in upcoming talks with South 
Africa's government officials. Gore explained that the South African government has to assure it 
would "not undermine legal protections" for patent holders (Scherrer, 1999). In April 1999 the US 
even went further and placed South Africa on a trade "watch list". Moreover, Mr. Gore, as the 
chairman of the U.S./South Africa Bi-national Commission, threatened sanctions against South 
Africa if it went ahead with the law. However, after a furious demonstration against the PMA, it 
announced on 19 April 2001, that it was unconditionally withdrawing its legal action against the 
government (AIDS Legal Network).   26 
conducted  on  the  level  of  South  Africa,  the  legislation  proposed  by  the  SA 
government  (see  footnote  10)  might  have  been  justified.    If  maximization  of 
wealth is conducted on a global level, the outcome might be different.  Any wealth 
maximizing  legislation  for  a  certain  jurisdiction  creates  externalities  to  other 
jurisdictions if the intellectual creations cross the jurisdictions borders, and it is 
exactly the nature of intellectual creations to cross easily geographical borders.  
 
A  second  problem  of  IP  rights  as  the  optimal  method  to  create  incentives  is 
connected to the first but with broader implications on related markets. Rendering 
exclusivity  in  informational  goods  gives  right  holders  strategic  advantage, 
allowing  them  to  exercise  control  over  informational  goods  far  beyond  the 
carefully defined list of rights and the economic purposes they were design to 
serve.  The  incentives  paradigm  focuses  on  the  proper  scope  of  incentives.  It 
overlooks, however, the overall effects of intellectual property rights. Intellectual 
property laws have turned out to be a major mean of expanding market power, 
reducing competition and concentrating control over production and distribution 
of information and derivative goods and services (Boldrin & Levine, 2010).  
 
Consider, for instance, copyright law. The fundamental copyright is the exclusive 
right to copy or the right to exclude copiers. Yet, copyright law in recent years 
became a vehicle of control, and copyrights are being claimed for accomplishing 
strategic  ends  (Elkin-Koren,  2002;  Littman,  2006,  pp.  77-88).  Copyrights  had 
been used strategically in order to increase barriers on entry (which are otherwise 
low)  and  to  reduce  the  risks  of  competition.  Thus,  even  when  royalties  were 
offered,  copyrights  were  the  bases  for  substantiating  control  over  distribution 
channels, such as cable retransmission of broadcast, Internet television streaming 
and the legal campaign against P2P distribution architecture.11  
                                                             
11 For example, in 2000 Several copyright holders in the USA, such as the National Football 
League  ("NFL"),  National  Basketball  Association  ("NBA"),  Twentieth  Century  Fox  Film 
Corporation,  Disney  Enterprises,  Inc.,  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer  Studios  Inc.,  Universal  City 
Studios, Inc., Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., ABC, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., and   27 
 
This legal strategy often allows right holders to expand their market power and 
accumulate  control  over  other  markets.  As  Lawrence  Lessig  described  it, 
strengthening  copyright  law  will  stifle  technological  advancement,  and  the 
opposite - strengthening technology will weaken the right holder control (Lessig, 
1999, pp. 125-126). In real property the legal protection is necessary in order to 
create incentives to produce and protect the right of possession. In intellectual 
property law, in contrast, there is a need only to generate sufficient incentives to 
create. Thus, with regards to intellectual property there is a need only for less than 
prefect control, while in real property the law must provide perfect control to the 
owner. Intellectual property law, therefore, should include built-in limits on the 
power of the right holders to control the use of their works (Lessig, 1999, pp. 133-
134).  
 
From  an  economic  analysis  perspective,  the  last  point  demonstrates  again  the 
problems of the territorial maximization unit and externalities, but it touches on 
                                                             
Fox  Broadcasting  Company,  launched  a  civil  action  in  the  USA  against  iCraveTV  and 
TVRadioNow Corp., private Canadian companies (iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831). iCraveTV had 
streamed copyrighted programs, such as professional football and basketball games as well as 
programs  such  as  "60  Minutes,"  "Ally  McBeal,"  and  "Star  Trek  Voyager,"  framed  with 
advertisements obtained by iCraveTV, to computer users in the United States over the Internet. 
The steaming technology allowed iCraveTV to capture United States programming from television 
stations in the US, convert these television signals into computerized data and stream them over 
the Internet from their website. Any Internet user could have accessed iCraveTV.com by simply 
entering three digits of any Canadian area code, one of which is provided to the user on the site 
itself, and by clicking two other buttons. 
The  American  court  ruled  that  although  the  streaming  of  the  plaintiffs'  programming 
originated  in  Canada,  subject  matter  jurisdiction  exists  because  acts  of  infringement  were 
committed  within  the  United  States.  The  fact  that  United  States  citizens  receive  and  view 
iCraveTV's streaming of the copyrighted materials constitutes at least public performances in the 
United States. Therefore, the court ruled that iCraveTV violated the plaintiffs' rights to perform 
their works publicly and to control the authorization for others to do so. In addition, iCraveTV's 
have  also  engaged  in  contributory  infringement  by  making  the  plaintiffs'  copyrighted 
programming available on the Internet with the knowledge that third parties could and would 
further infringe the plaintiffs' copyrights by further transmitting (and publicly performing) the 
programs.  The  irreparable  harm  that  the  Plaintiffs  are  likely  to  face,  according  to  the  court, 
constitutes lost of control, which Congress vested with the copyright holders of the copyrighted 
materials.  The  court  further  held  that  Plaintiffs  had  lost  the  ability  to  offer  particular  outlets, 
exclusive  rights  in  particular  programs  or  series,  and  a  loss  of  customers’  good  will. O t h e r  
strategic suits were aimed at controlling the format of distribution to govern access to creative 
works.   28 
additional  problems.  Copyright  and  other  forms  of  IP  are  limited  to  control 
copying  of  the  work  and  not  usage  or  enjoyment.    Whether  certain  usage  or 
enjoyment of the creation involves copying is a question of technology. Designing 
the  optimal  copyright  arrangements,  which  would  maximize  wealth  (once  we 
agree  about  the  maximization  unit)  in  terms  of  duration  of  right  and  list  of 
exceptions, strongly depends on the current state of technology.  Technological 
changes will alter the optimal legal arrangement.  In our times, when technology 
changes so rapidly, it is practically impossible for the law to adapt itself with each 
technological advancement, especially when the course and pace of technological 
changes are crucially affected by the law itself and by IP legislation in particular 
(Elkin-Koren and Salzberger, 2004, Ch.  8). 
 
A similar problem characterizes patent law. As many commentators observed, the 
economic value of patents is not confined to the expected value that could be 
extracted from each patent. Patents reward innovators by granting a patentee the 
right to exclude others from practicing the patented invention. However, unlike 
copyright, in order to be granted IPR, registration has to be applied for and not all 
applications  for  registration  are  approved.  Moreover,  as  Lemley  and  Shapiro 
(2005) assert, a patent does not provide absolute exclusion, but rather presents a 
legal right to try to exclude. The patent right is therefore a probabilistic property 
right. According to empirical data the vast majority of patents that are issued are 
never litigated and roughly half of those patents that are fully litigated are found to 
be invalid, thus most patents represent highly uncertain property rights.12  In this 
                                                             
12 L e m l e y  a n d  S h a p i r o  (2005)  argue  that  inventors  have  strong  incentives  to  file  a  patent 
application  very  early  in  the  invention  process,  since  they  have  a  limited  time  from  the 
commercialization of the product and disclosure of an idea till the deadline for patent application. 
In the US this time period is only one year. In Europe there is no such grace period, and hence the 
incentives to file a patent application as soon as possible are even stronger. As a result, many 
inventors  file  patent  applications  without  any  clear  idea  of  whether  the  invention  will  be  a 
commercial success, and in some instances whether the category of invention is even patentable at 
all. The expected outcome of the vast patent application every year and the early phase of their 
filling is that the examination process in the Patent Office (PTO) is not broad and deep. The 
overwhelming majority of patent applications in the United States, at least 85%, ultimately result 
in an issued patent (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, p. 79).  Only a small percentage of the patents 
materialize to be of economic value. Among those even a smaller portion are enforced or reach   29 
sense, patents are a mixture of a property right and a lottery. Inventors who are 
uncertain of the value of their ideas ex ante file to patent many of them, knowing 
that most of the resulting patents will turn out to be worthless but hoping that a 
few of the resulting patents will pay off big time (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, p. 
81). In fact, research shows that the expected value of many individual patents is 
small.  Industry  participants  do  not  consider  patents  an  effective  appropriation 
mechanism. Patents are even considered inferior to other methods, such as lead-
time, learning curve advantages and even secrecy (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 
1987, pp. 793-802).  
 
The costs of patent registration and litigation on average outweigh their value.13 It 
seems therefore that filing for patents is serving functions other than securing 
incentives to create or invest. Indeed, patents are being used strategically, often in 
aggregation, in order to defend against hostile acquisitions and patent wars, to 
prevent competitors from entering a market, and to maintain a strategic market 
lead.14  A  strategy  for  using  patents  as  a  source  for  revenues,  which  has  been 
                                                             
litigation. On the average only 1.5% of all patents are ever litigated and only 0.1% are litigated to 
trial (although the litigation rates is 6% in biotechnology). Out of the patents litigated to a final 
determination (appeal, trial, or summary judgment), 46% are held invalid (Lemley and Shapiro, 
2005, p. 80). As one can realize the cost involved in registration are huge in proportion to the 
actual usage of the vast majority of registered patents. 
13 Wagner and Parchomovsky (2005) compared the average cost of patent application and the 
value of the average patent in the US. They estimated that the cost of filing a patent application 
with the PTO, including attorney, filing, issue and renewal fees, is between $10,000 and $30,000. 
The average cost of patent litigation is $799,000 for each party through the end of discovery, and 
$1,503,000 through the end of trial and appeal. However, on the value side, empirical data shows 
that the value of a patent is pretty low. A study from 1986 found that 90 percent of the patents in 
France, Germany, and the U.K. have a value of less than $25,000 (Pakes, 1986, p. 774). A more 
recent study from 1998 reinforced that conclusion. In this study it was estimated that the average 
pharmaceutical patent value is $4,313. It is $4,969 for chemical patents, $15,120 for mechanical 
patents and $19,837 for electronics patents (Schankerman, 1998). Despite the high private cost of 
patent  protection  and  the  relatively  low  expected  value  of  individual  patents,  Wagner  and 
Parchomovsky (2005, pp. 11-17) found that the number of filings in the U.S. (and worldwide) 
continues to increase. What can be the explanation? 
14 Clarisa Long (2002, pp. 627-637) asserted that the prime value of patent rights is in their 
function  as  credible  signals.  The  patents  are  used  to  credibly  convey  information  about  the 
invention  and  the  inventors  to  those  she  calls  observers,  i.e. t h e  n o n -owners.  The  signals  are 
necessary since otherwise the observers will probably not invest in gathering that information 
themselves. In this sense the value of the patents is the reduction of the informational asymmetries 
between patentees and third parties.   30 
developing over the last several years, is reflected by organizations that license but 
do  not  commercialize  patents.  They  function  for  the  sole  purpose  of  asserting 
patents against potential infringers. A recent case, which exemplifies this pattern, 
was the one of Intel in 2004. In that case, a patent licensing company purchased a 
patent for $50,000 and then sought $7 billion from Intel for alleged infringement 
by the company's Pentium II semiconductor. Although the court dismissed the 
case, Intel was forced to pay $3 million in legal fees (Landers, 2006). 
 
A possible economic theory explanation for filing for patents despite the negative 
cost-benefit calculus is behavior under risk. Patents are essentially lottery tickets. 
Unlike gambling, though, filing for patents manifests a risk-averse attitude in a 
similar way to buying insurance. However, unlike insurance, big companies who 
file for many patents and win from time to time can set the price of the winning 
patent in such a way that it covers all the huge expenses of the vast majority of 
unsuccessful  patents.    In  other  words,  the  costs  are  shifted  to  the  consumers.  
Pooling  is  a  mechanism  to  decrease  the  risk  even  further.  According  to  this 
defensive strategy the acquisition of patents is a kind of an arms race.  In addition, 
competing firms use patents as bargaining chips to negotiate with competitors and 
to secure certain niches in the marketplace. The assumption in the base of this 
theory is that courts enforce patent rights harshly, and hence the possibility of 
patent litigation threats towards competing firms (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, pp. 
105-107).  
 
The  differences  between  Copyright  and  Patent  are  the  consequence  of  the 
significant costs involved in getting patent protection, while copyright is granted 
automatically  with  no  cost  at  all.    These  costs  themselves  raise  the  question 
whether a patent system is the optimal way to generate incentives to create and 
invent.  However,  the  effects  of  granting  IP  rights  in  both  realms  are  similar. 
According  to  all  these  empirical  findings  and  explanations,  the  inter-relations 
between patents and copyright, on the one hand, and incentives to create, on the   31 
other hand, remain very vague, and it seems that the effects of granting patents 
and gaining copyright are beyond the incentives to create the immediate protected 
creation or innovation. 
 
A third point of criticism against IPR system as the optimal system to secure 
incentives relates to its increasing role in de-facto impeding production of content 
and  creation  by  individuals  and  communities.  This  is  the  result  of  increasing 
transaction  costs  of  both  obtaining  IPR  and  licensing  them,  in  addition  to  the 
actual  prices,  well  above  the  marginal  cost,  of  existing  works,  which  are  an 
essential resource for producing new works. We discussed above the increasing 
cost of operating the patent apparatus, which outweighs in average their value. 
Similarly, the costs associated with licensing copyrighted materials has increased 
expeditiously  in  recent  years  whereas  the  intellectual  proprietary  regime  is 
covering more and more informational works and affords protection to types of 
works, or new aspects of works, that used to be in the public domain. For instance, 
copyright and neighboring rights today enable protection for facts and mere data. 
The bundle of rights defined by copyright was expanded in recent years to cover a 
wider  range  of  uses,  for  example,  the  right  to  prevent  unauthorized  access  to 
works in digital format, the protection of novel subject matters (such as data and 
databases)  and  all  of  this  for  an  extended  duration.  Another  semi-concealed 
expansion  is  anti-circumvention  legislation,  such  as  the  DMCA  (17  U.S.C.  § 
1201), which protects the use of Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems to 
govern  the  use  of  works  and  physically  limit  access  and  usage  even  for 
information  not  entitled  directly  to  copyright  protection  or  for  which  such 
protection had expired. The expanded coverage of IPR reduces the volume of 
works that are freely available to build upon (Lessig, 2004; Boyle, 2003; Karjala, 
1997). Some characteristics of the digital environment also bring informational 
works to be less available. For instance, overlapping rights held by different right 
holders  make  it  more  costly  to  secure  a  license  to  use  a  copyrighted  work 
(Lemley, 1997). Overall, expansive copyright and patent rights, supplemented by 
extra protection under other bodies of law, which is supported by mainstream Law   32 
and  Economic  scholars  under  the  emerging  propriety  paradigm,  create  new 
barriers to accessing preexisting materials. 
 
Licensing is becoming more expensive not only for users but also for the right-
holders.  It  may  require  legal  counseling  regarding  the  scope  of  copyright 
protection, the legal definition of authorized uses and the legal language used to 
describe them. Right holders are more likely to incur the cost of licensing when 
they expect to benefit, i.e. when they license the work for commercial use. They 
may be reluctant, however, to incur the high cost of licensing for non-commercial 
uses.  Consequently,  licensing  costs  may  prevent  the  use  of  works  that  would 
otherwise become available, thus impeding access and subsequent creation. The 
high transaction costs associated with the copyright system create a chilling effect 
and  reduce  the  level  of  desirable  uses.    It  also  has  an  increasingly  unequal 
distributive  effect.  Licenses  are  more  affordable  and  accessible  to  businesses, 
which roll over the costs to consumers. They create a more notable chilling effect 
on  creation  by  individuals.  This  inequality  is  likely  to  have  far-reaching 
ramifications on the nature of future culture and society. 
 
The  increasing  propertization  and  IP-involved  transaction  costs  were  the  main 
forces  motivating  several  movements  that  try  to  bypass  the  rigid  IPR  system. 
Notable examples are the Free Software movement and Creative Commons. Free 
Software is an innovative legal framework attempting to address the impediments 
on access created by intellectual property and is based on contracts. Free software 
is protected by copyright, but is subject to a license called General Public License 
(GPL). The GPL licenses the unlimited copying, redistribution and modifications 
of the software. The license is a “viral contract”, aiming its application to future 
users in an attempt to make whole commitments run with this digital code (Radin, 
2000).  It  includes  a  viral  provision  requiring  that  any  derivative  work  that 
contains free software or derives from it, will be subject to the same license. GPL 
annuls the need for license fees and the burden of negotiating. This subversive use 
of  copyright  law  does  not  utilize  the  proprietary  regime  for  generating   33 
“incentives”  (or  rather  profits),  but  for  creating  an  alternative  non-proprietary 
regime,  often  referred  to  as  Copyleft.    Creative  Commons  uses  the  same 
principles  to  a  much  broader  range  of  informational  creations.  The  initiative 
developed  an  infrastructure,  legal  and  technological,  that  arguably  could 
overcome  the  impediments  to  accessing  creative  works,  for  the  purpose  of 
reducing the chilling effect on creativity caused by the high cost of licensing. The 
automated licensing platform allows authors to retain copyright in their respective 
works, and authorize as many uses of the work as they choose. The hope is that 
such a mechanism would make it easier for right holders to share their works 
under  more  generous  terms.  Yet,  in  contrast  to  the  GPL,  Creative  Commons' 
licensing  scheme  includes  a  wide  variety  of  licenses.  Every  license  that  goes 
beyond  absolute  exclusion  is  considered  to  be  a  sufficient  instrument  for 
promoting, sharing and reuse.  
 
From a Law and Economics perspective, these new developments can be analyzed 
in the framework of the Coase 1960 theorem.  Coase argued that inefficient legal 
rules will be bypassed by individuals attempting to achieve efficient allocation of 
entitlements, but this will happen only when there are no transaction costs. The 
Internet and related new technologies can be characterized, at least partially, as 
reducing  transaction  costs  (Elkin-Koren  and  Salzberger,  2004,  Ch.  7)  and 
therefore enabling to bargain in the shadow of inefficient IP laws. Those recent 
developments can therefore be explained not only in terms of altruistic behavior 
and  political  agenda  but  also  in  terms  of  traditional  economic  theory. 
Nevertheless, they point to the inefficiency of the current IPR regime. 
 
The last point of criticism against IPR system as generating incentives is more 
philosophical and a broader criticism of the law and economics methodology. It 
has to do with the inability to determine what is the desirable or optimal level of 
creation or innovation incentives ought to aim at.  No doubt that as a result of 
extending IPR we witness a vast expansion of the entertainment industries, as well 
as high tech related industries.  Without this expansion we might not have had   34 
some of the recent Hollywood mega production movies.  But, do these movies 
really represent efficient level of informational and artistic production?  Are they 
comparable  to  great  artistic  masterpieces  that  were  created  under  much  more 
limited  copyright  regime  or  prior  to  copyright  protection?  Equivalents  can  be 
drawn to patents motivated industries and the enormous number of new gadgets, 
which last in our life shorter and shorter periods because the legal regime and IPR 
incentivize to replace them with new ones.  The same questions can be even asked 
with regard to the pharmaceutical industry, which generally speaking, is geared to 
a worthy and important cause - improving our health, but it can be argued that it 
produces many insignificant products, motivated by generating profits from IP.  
Whether the increasingly pace of replacing gadgets is a good indicator for growth, 
development and progress remains an open question.  
 
3. THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS AND THE PROPRIETY MODEL OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
Alongside the incentives-public goods paradigm for the analysis of intellectual 
property  there  is  another  Law  and  Economics  framework  for  analyzing  IPR, 
which is also a major pillar of economic analysis of property rights in general. It 
originated  from  the  veteran  “Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  literature,  which  was 
shifted  to  justify  property  rights  in  land  and  tangibles,  applied  to  intellectual 
property.  This  framework  has  been  emerging  in  recent  years  as  the  dominant 
paradigm  for  economic  analysis  of  IPR,  and  can  be  titled    “the  proprietary 
approach to intellectual property”. This new approach focuses on the management 
of intangible assets once created rather than on stimulating investments in creative 
activities and inducing innovation (e.g. Kitch, 1977; Wagner, 2003) and thus it 
implicitly  overlooks  the  basic  foundations  of  the  teleological  normative 
justifications for granting intellectual property rights in the first place. 
 
This section will briefly discuss the tragedy of the commons, which is the oldest 
and major Law and Economic framework for the positive analysis of emergence   35 
of property rights in general, and land law in particular.  We will, subsequently 
show how this analytical framework was extended to explain intellectual property, 
transformed  to  be  its  dominant  normative  analysis  (as  opposed  to  positive 
analysis) and how it entrenched the view of Law and Economics scholars that any 
intellectual creation is to be considered as property. 
 
3.1  The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  as  a  Source  for  Property  Rights  and  for 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Parallels were drown between the English enclosure movement, the process of 
fencing communal land and turning it into private property, which lasted from the 
15
th to the 19
th centuries, and the recent trend of commodification of information 
and the expansion of intellectual property rights (Boyle, 2003a). From a Law and 
Economics perspective the first enclosure movement is treated mainly in context 
of the tragedy of the commons model, which is dominated by positive analysis 
(explaining the emergence of property rights rather than justifying it).  Although 
the term tragedy of the commons is attributed to Hardin (1968) it was, in fact, 
Harold Demsetz (1967) who first offered this theoretical framework to analyze the 
emergence of property rights.15   
 
Demsetz held that property rights are established in response to the demands of 
interacting individuals for adjustment of existing relationships to new cost-benefit 
possibilities. Thus, “the emergence of new private or state-owned property rights 
will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices” (Demsetz, 1967, 
p. 349). His analysis begins with a state of nature – a world lacking property 
rights,  thus  rejecting  the  Natural  Law  concept  of  property  rights  (and  by 
derivation  the  Natural  rights  concept  of  intellectual  property).    In  the  state  of 
nature, land, and everything on it, are owned by no one, or rather by everyone. 
This can be an optimal and static equilibrium if every individual can use and 
produce from the land everything he or she is seeking for. Population growth and 
                                                             
15  An earlier version of this analysis can be attributed to Gordon (1954).   36 
density may change this equilibrium. So does an increase in demand, which is 
beyond the consumption needs of the local population. Once such circumstances 
occur, a clash between individuals over the land and what is on it will take place, 
which will lead to over-consumption and a tragedy of the commons – bringing all 
individuals to a worse-off situation. Rational individuals, therefore, will agree on 
the establishment of individual property rights.16 
 
It is important to emphasize that Demsetz provides us with a positive analysis of 
the development of property rights, which is also a dynamic analysis portraying 
the process of propertization (and, as we shall see later, de-propertization). In 
contrast to the public goods analysis of the incentives framework, his description 
precedes property rights granted by a legal system in the framework of a modern 
state  or  central  government,  which  is  called  upon  to  intervene  in  the  market 
activities. Individuals will act in accordance with their own interests to create 
agreed upon rules, in a similar way to Hobbes’ (1660) general description of the 
shift  from  the  state  of  nature  to  the  emergence  of  the  State  and  central 
government.  Implicitly the description of Demsetz (similarly to Hobbes’) is also 
a normative analysis (Frischmann, 2007). In other words, Demsetz endorses the 
market  creation  of  property  rights  because  it  fulfils  the  efficiency  criterion, 
defined probably in terms of welfare and utility maximization as well as Pareto 
                                                             
16  Demsetz  compared  the  creation  of  property  rights  among  the  Native  Americans  in  the 
Northeast  and  in  the  Southwest.  When  hunting  was  primarily  for  purposes  of  food  and  the 
relatively few furs that were required for the hunter’s family, Demsetz wrote, “Hunting could be 
practiced freely and was carried on without assessing its impact on other hunters… There did not 
exist anything resembling private ownership in land.” (Demstez, 1967, p. 351). But the fur trade 
changed that equilibrium. First, the value of the furs to the Indians increased considerably. Second, 
and as a result, the scale of hunting activity rose sharply. Without collective agreed upon rules this 
change meant exhausting resources in the present and creating shortage for the future. So the tribes 
developed territorial hunting and trapping rights to make sure that the resources were cared for 
prudently and to enhance long-term availability of animals to hunt. Why have the indigenous 
peoples of the American Southwest not developed similar institutions? Demsetz cites two reasons. 
First, in their areas there were no animals of commercial importance comparable to the fur-bearing 
animals  of  the  north.  Second,  those  animals  that  did  populate  the  Southwest  were  primarily 
grazing species that tended to wander over large tracts of land, making it difficult to associate 
them  with  specific  land  boundaries  and  to  allocate  limited  rights  of  hunting t h e m  t o  s p e c i f i c  
individuals or groups. “Hence both the value and cost of establishing private hunting lands in the 
Southwest are such that we would expect little development along these lines. The externality was 
just not worth taking into account,” wrote Demsetz  (1967, p. 352).   37 
optimality. His theory is based on equilibrium between normative and positive 
analyses (Demsetz, 2008), which is not the case for the analysis of the incentives 
model. 
 
Subsequent  literature  transformed  the  positive  analysis  of  the  “tragedy  of  the 
commons”  to  an  externality-type  market  failure  analysis  that  provides  also  a 
predominant  justification  for  central  intervention  by  the  government.    Such  is 
Hardin’s argument in favor of privatizing the commons (Hardin, 1968). When too 
many individuals are privileged to use a resource, such as a lake, they will tend to 
overuse  it.  This  is  because  each  individual  will  bear  only  the  benefits  of 
consuming the resource, such as maximizing fishing, but will not bear the full cost 
of such a use, namely exhausting the fishery. In other words, individuals do not 
internalize the negative consequences that their consumption may have on the 
resource  and,  therefore,  the  separate  action  of  each  individual  may  bring  to 
collective  over-consumption  of  the  resource.  In  microeconomic  theory  this 
phenomenon is regarded as a negative externality, which requires intervention in 
the market. Although externalities and public goods failures of the market can 
overlap, the example above is not a pure public good problem because it does not 
involve the failure to produce the good in the first place. 
 
On a first glance the application of the “Tragedy of the Commons” to intellectual 
property seems appealing.  Overuse of land and its resources in the absence of 
property rights are equivalent to overuse of innovations and intellectual creations, 
which is likely to bring about crucial decrease in their production in the absence 
of  intellectual  property  rights.    Moreover,  current  developments  in  intellectual 
property  laws  are  in  line  with  Demsetz’s  theory,  according  to  which  the 
emergence of new property rights will take place in response to a technological 
change. Beside legal changes, the use of DRMs, self-help technological means 
and contractual arrangements for expanding control over the use of increasingly 
valuable informational goods reflect a response to the instability introduced by 
information technologies and new legislation.    38 
 
However, several major differences ought to be pointed and looked upon more 
carefully when we apply Demsetz’ theory to the contemporary analysis of the 
expansion of intellectual property and its effects on the commons or on the public 
domain and as a general framework for the positive and normative analysis of 
IPR. First, in contrast to land and other physical resources, informational goods 
do  not  exist  in  nature;  they  are  human  created.  Intellectual  property  rights, 
therefore, would not be established primarily to prevent over-consumption, but to 
enable production (and perhaps, as we shall see bellow, profit making). Indeed, as 
we  shall  see  later  the  embracement  of  Demsetz  by  the  propriety  paradigm 
overlooks this difference and emphasizes the fact that informational goods can 
also be over-consumed. 
 
Second,  unlike  land  and  tangibles,  which  are  limited  resources,  informational 
goods do not have capacity limits. The functions of property rights in the case of 
information would not be to prevent over-consumption, but to incentivize creation 
and perhaps to optimize value (or profits), functions which are very different from 
the  traditional  tragedy  of  the  commons  analysis.  In  addition,  as  we  discussed 
extensively  in  the  previous  section,  information  is  non-rivalrous;  its  use  or 
consumption  does  not  prevent  others  from  parallel  consumption.  This  implies 
again  that  the  purpose  of  rights  is  different  from  property  rights  in  land  or 
tangibles. Indeed, the non-discretionary adoption of the tragedy of the commons 
framework to intellectual creations has an inherit bias to overlook the fundamental 
issues of creation and progress in favor of the questions of management and value 
or, rather, profit maximization.  Discussing value and profit maximization while 
ignoring who is entitled to them (pre-assuming that it is the inventor) is a distorted 
approach  from  a  teleological  normative  reasoning  which  Law  and  Economics 
claims to embrace.  
 
Third,  although  Demsetz  attributes  an  important  significance  to  technological 
changes and their impact on the creation and modifications of property rights, his   39 
analysis assumes technology to be an exogenous variable in the process of the 
emergence and transformation of property rights.  Since technological changes 
today are much more rapid and dynamic it is problematic to ignore them as an 
essential endogenous variable in the analysis of intellectual property. As I argued 
elsewhere,  technological  development  cannot  be  considered  exogenous  to  the 
legal analysis (Elkin-Koren and Salzberger, 2004). That is because the availability 
and cost of exclusion measures and the ability to exploit resources efficiently may 
depend, among other things, on the legal rules defining the scope of property 
rights.  The  ease  with  which  information  technologies  could  be  shaped  and 
modified  and  the  rapid  pace  of  technological  changes  suggest  that  in  the 
information environment it is necessary to consider the long-term impact of legal 
rules on the availability and nature of technologies and the directions in which 
they develop and vice versa, an analysis which is likely to take a different form 
and direction to the traditional tragedy of the commons.    
 
Fourth, Demsetz portrays the emergence of property rights as the result of market 
activities  without  the  intervention  of  the  state  or  central  government.  In  his 
description property rights are the result of social norms. This fact enables him to 
ignore  the  public  choice  aspects  of  the  emergence  of  new  property  regimes. 
Collective action problems, interest groups and rent seeking are absent from the 
analysis. This is not the case with the “second enclosure movement” and with the 
emergence and scope of IPR in general. We must take those differences on board 
when applying Demsetz's observations to current debates regarding justified and 
unjustified changes in intellectual property laws.  Put differently: unlike Demsetz’ 
original theory of property in which positive analysis is in an equilibrium with 
normative  analysis,  the  same  cannot  be  concluded  with  regard  to  intellectual 
property.  This is partly due to the fact that while land and what is on it are 
essential for everyone and thus their over-consumption will have a tragic effect 
across the board, the production of informational goods is limited to relatively a 
few (and even fewer who make their primary living out of it) and consumed by 
many. Hence there is a small likelihood that intellectual property rights will be   40 
established by spontaneous collective action rather than by a central government 
and/or by spontaneous individual self-help means. This difference has significant 
consequences not only on normative analysis but also on the positive analysis of 
the emergence of IPR. 
 
These  differences  point  to  a  conclusion  that  the  theory  of  Demsetz  certainly 
cannot help us in the justification of IPR and their ideal prescription, as it is used 
by  the  propriety  paradigm  (see  bellow).    Nevertheless,  It  remains  a  powerful 
positive theory in explaining changes in that realm.  The changes, however, do not 
reflect only propertization, the main thrust of Demsetz, but also de-propertization, 
and in the context of IP it might even be more relevant in explaining the later.  
According to this rationale, if governments (or for this sake any other central 
decision-making  bodies,  including  courts)  intervene  in  the  market  of  property 
rights, as is the contemporary situation regarding IP rights, market activities can 
bring to de-propertization. The phenomena of open source, creative commons and 
other  activities  of  enhancing  the  public  domain  can  be  understood  as  market 
responses to the inefficient expansion of property rights by central agencies.17 
Some of the variables specified by Demsetz can fit the description of the new 
mode of production of informational goods.  
 
For example, Demsetz referred to the analysis of corporations as an alternative 
structure  of  property  rights,  stating  that  “the  interplay  of  scale  economies, 
negotiating cost, externalities, and the modification of property rights can be seen 
in the most notable ‘exception’ to the assertion that ownership tends to be an 
individual  affair:  the  publicly-held  corporation”  (Demsetz,  1967,  pp.  357).18 
                                                             
17 Demsetz himself hinted at this direction by asserting that “The greater are diseconomies of 
scale  to  land  ownership  the  more  will  contractual  arrangement  be  used  by  the  interacting 
neighbors to settle these differences. Negotiating and policing costs will be compared to costs that 
depend on the scale of ownership, and parcels of land will tend to be owned in sizes which 
minimize the sum of these costs” (Demsetz, 1967, p. 357). 
18 “We assume that significant economies of scale in the operation of large corporations is a fact 
and, also, that large requirements for equity capital can be satisfied more cheaply by acquiring the 
capital  from  many  purchasers  of  equity  shares.  While  economies  of  scale  in  operating  these   41 
Benkler  (2002a)  emphasizes  the  peer  production  mode  as  an  alternative  to 
production within a firm. However, if we focus on the property rights aspects of 
this  new  production  mode,  the  analogy  between  corporations  and  the  market-
driven enlargement of the public domain can be of great interest. In other words, 
Demsetz’ 1967 statement regarding the nature of corporation can actually, with 
small modifications, describe the property rights aspect of the peer production 
process emerging today (Elkin Koren and Salzberger, 2004, pp. 62, 130-136). The 
decreasing transaction costs and contract forming costs are bringing to greater 
production outside firms and back into the markets. However, the atomization of 
joint work efforts enabled by the new technologies creates new type of market 
activity not seen before the Internet revolution. As we shall see bellow the Law 
and Economics took Demsetz’ theory in a totally different direction. 
 
 
3.2  The  Paradigmatic  Shift  of  Law  and  Economics  from  the  Incentives  to  the 
Propriety Paradigm 
 
One  of  the  prime  arguments  of  this  paper  is  that  the  mainstream  Law  and 
Economics  literature  has  been  shifting  in  recent  years  from  the  incentives 
paradigm to the propriety one. This shift was partly motivated by the inability of 
the incentives paradigm to point to the optimal balance of the scope and duration 
of IPR and the political reality bringing about new legislation, which could not be 
justified  by  the  old  paradigm.  Many  Law  and  Economics  scholars  wanted  to 
endorse  the  new  laws  and  thus  shifted  their  analysis  to  a  new  paradigmatic 
thinking.  
 
An early sign of the new paradigm can be found in the shift from focusing on 
incentives to create and innovate to focusing on incentives to improve existing 
                                                             
enterprises  exist, e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  i n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  d o  n o t .   H e n c e ,  i t  b e c o m e s  
desirable for many ‘owners’ to form a joint-stock company”(Demsetz, 1967, pp. 357).   42 
creations.  Edmund  Kitch  (1977),  for  example,  argued  that  patent  rights  are 
necessary as a mean to encourage efficient usage of existing inventions rather than 
the creation of new ones. We should grant patents in advance of an invention, he 
argued, making patent a right to "prospect" a particular field for an invention. 
Kitch’s theory lies on two basic assumptions. The first assumption is that creators 
will  not  invest  in  putting  their  invention  to  efficient  use  unless  they  obtain 
exclusive rights to the invention. Without exclusive rights the inventors will fear 
their  investment  will  result  in  unpatentable  information  appropriable  by 
competitors.  The  second  assumption  is  based  on  the  presumption  of  perfect 
information,  perfect  rationality,  and  zero  transaction  costs.  According  to  this 
second assumption the exclusive patent right should lead to an efficient licensing 
to both users and potential improvers. 
 
Kitch's  argument  reappeared  in  a  somewhat  different  form  as  a  supporting 
argument for the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which 
added twenty more years to the already long copyright term, including existing 
creations. The American Congress obviously could have not justified retroactive 
extension on the ground that it would encourage dead people to produce more 
works (Lamley, 2004, p.133) so the justification shifted to the maximization of 
value  of  existing  creations  in  a  similar  way  to  the  tragedy  of  the  commons 
argument.  According  to  this  argument  extending  intellectual  property  rights  is 
necessary to give existing copyright owners incentives to preserve films they had 
already made, and to distribute books they had already published. The rationale 
behind the law was to prevent a work from entering the public domain. Such 
prevention is necessary, according to the argument, because once a work entered 
the public domain it is "orphan" and no one has any incentive to take care of it. 
 
The  shift  from  the  incentives  paradigm  to  the  propriety  paradigm  is  best 
exemplified when we compare the 1989 work of two Law and Economics icons – 
William Landes and Richard Posner - with their recent work (Landes and Posner   43 
2003, 2003a). The early writings of Landes and Posner focused on the market 
failure of public goods as the main justification for IP rights. The focal point of 
their public goods analysis was that since the marginal costs of copying a work or 
a creation are minimal (almost zero) the market price of a non propertied work 
will be so low that it will not cover the initial investment of its creator and thus 
new  works  would  not  be  developed.  Only  propertization  of  such  works,  they 
argued, will grant sufficient incentives for their creation in the first place. Landes 
and Posner (1989) portrayed copyright (and by extension other types of IP) as a 
mechanism  to  enhance  incentives  to  create,  but  also  acknowledged  that  the 
benefits should be outweighed with the administrative costs of registration and 
enforcement  and,  more  importantly,  with  the  benefits  of  wide  access  to 
information, which is the main source for new ideas and creations.  They wrote: 
“…beyond some level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by 
raising  the  cost  of  expression…    Creating  a  new  work  typically  involves 
borrowing  or  building  on  material  from  a  prior  body  of  works…  The  less 
extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator 
can  borrow  from  previous  works  without  infringing  copyright  and  the  lower, 
therefore, the costs of creating a new work” (Landes and Posner, 1989, pp. 332).  
This  is  the  prime  reason  for  limiting  the  duration  of  intellectual  property  as 
opposed to real property, which is exclusive and rivalrous in its usage. 
 
In  their  later  papers,  however,  Landes  and  Posner  (2003,  2003a)  change  their 
analysis and advocate for an indefinitely renewable copyright, instead of IP rights 
limited in duration. It is puzzling how in this recent writings the authors ignore the 
major reason, mentioned in their earlier piece, for limiting the duration of IP – that 
propertization, while, on the one hand, provides incentives for creation, on the 
other hand, limits the sources for new creations and thus is likely to reduce such 
creations.  Instead they specify six other reasons, connected mainly to transaction 
costs,  for  limiting  the  duration  of  IP  and  argue  that  these  reasons  are  not 
convincing anymore. The main thrust of their later argument disputes or at least 
overlooks the first difference we mentioned above between land and informational   44 
goods – the public good nature of the latter, which would prevent a real tragedy of 
the commons even if there is no propertization. Posner and Landes argue that this 
is  not  correct  because  overuse  of  ideas,  images,  literary  characters  etc.  will 
decrease  their  value  and  hence  their  usage  is,  in  fact,  rivalrous.  Surprisingly 
(maybe not if one thinks about the context of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act), their main example is Disney’s Mickey Mouse, on which they 
write:  “If  because  copyright  had  expired  anyone  were  free  to  incorporate  the 
Mickey Mouse character in a book, movie, song, etc., the value of the character 
might plummet. Not only the public would rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his 
image would be blurred, as some authors portray him as Casanova, others as cat 
meat, others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of 
Minnie”. (Landes and Posner 2003, pp. 487-488).   
 
Posner  and  Landes’  point  is  similar  to  Demsetz’  qualifications  regarding  the 
potential effects of new ideas and creations on old ones, and in this sense the 
differences between land and informational goods might not be so big.  However, 
they ignore the network effect of informational goods, which is likely to balance 
the decreasing value of wider usage of the creation. Wider usage of informational 
goods  improves  connectivity.  If  more  people  use  the  same  software  or 
communication technique than everyone can benefit more from this software or 
communication platform. Similarly, it can be more generally argued that widely 
shared heroes, symbols, stories and alike enhance the total value of these cultural 
icons for society. In contrast, Posner and Landes’ description focuses in fact on 
the value or profit for the producer rather than the total value for society in large 
(see  also  Boldrein  and  Levine,  2010).  Their  emphasis  on  the  value  to  the 
producers  reveals  the  paradigmatic  shift  and  the  presumption  that  intellectual 
creations are to be considered as the property of their creator. More importantly, in 
their later paper Landes and Posner ignore the main point - the contribution of the 
ideas and creations in the public domain to the development of new ideas and 
creations, which is the main characteristics of informational goods, distinguishing 
them from tangibles and real estate. In this sense the major difference between the   45 
informational public domain and the physical public sphere or commons is that 
the former is not only a common pool for non-rivalrous consumption but also a 
common  production  mean,  which  can  foster  Pareto  improvements  not  only  in 
consumption but also in production. 
 
Supporting  the  retroactive  extension  of  copyright,  Landes  and  Posner  also 
endorsed Kitch’s argument that incentives are needed in order to encourage the 
investment  in  creations’  distribution  and  promotion.  They  write:  "Recording 
companies differentiate their product by promoting the performer or artist who has 
signed an exclusive contract with the company. Because a recording company can, 
for example, copyright the Chicago Symphony Orchestra's recording of Mahler's 
first Symphony, it has an incentive to promote that version; it has little incentive to 
promote the public domain work of an unknown composer, since it could not 
appropriate the benefits of its promotional efforts, as distinct from benefits that 
might accrue from a recorded performance of the unknown composer's work by a 
popular performer" (Landes and Posner, 2003a, p. 230).  
 
They  go  further  to  contend  that  incentives  are  needed  for  promoting  not  only 
marketing  efforts,  but  also  persistent  improvements  of  the  good  in  order  to 
preserve its value. They emphasize that their support of the copyright extension is 
based on the traditional incentive-based argument for property right, but with a 
‘new  twist’.  Incentives  are  not  exhausted  in  the  initial  creation  of  intellectual 
property goods. The incentives are further necessary to "maintain the value of the 
property  and  also  to  resurrect  abandoned  or  otherwise  unexploited  intellectual 
property." The example they use again is the most popular mouse ever, Mickey 
Mouse. Disney Corporation has spent over the years enormous amounts of money 
refurbishing  the  Mickey  Mouse  character,  "both  by  subtle  alterations  in  the 
character and by situating it in carefully selected entertainment contexts in an 
effort to increase the appeal of Mickey Mouse to the current generation of young 
children".  While  using  this  example  Landes  and  Posner  bother  to  state  that  it   46 
seems unlikely that only most recent version of the character retains commercial 
appeal (Landes and Posner, 2003a, pp. 231-233). 
 
Ironically,  the  new  propriety  paradigm,  not  only  ignores  the  initial  normative 
justifications  for  intellectual  property  rights,  it  also  undermines  some 
fundamentals of competitive market theory. As Mark Lemley (2004) justifiably 
writes, competition and the invisible hand is what drive the market to efficiency. 
The meaning of Kitch's argument and its successors is that only one skilled firm in 
the market can reach the efficient outcome, and for doing so society must provide 
it with the adequate incentives. The fact that goods in a particular market were 
protected  as  the  result  of  exclusive  rights  in  the  past,  either  patent  rights  or 
copyrights,  does  not  mean  that  their  initial  inventors  are  the  most  efficient 
producers forever. On the contrary, granting one company the exclusive right to 
make these goods would likely to result in an increase in the price and a decrease 
in  the  supply.  Even  if  a  manger  is  necessary  for  efficient  distribution  of 
intellectual  property  goods,  it  does  not  mean  that  the  creator  is  the  best  and 
adequate  manager.  Creators  are  often  terrible  managers.  They  frequently 
misunderstand the significance of their own inventions and the uses to which they 
can be put. Moreover, even if creators have the perfect management skills, their 
successors, the ones who will hold the exclusive right later on, may not be as 
good.  According to Lemley, empirical evidence strongly supports the intuition of 
the  market.  A  comparison  of  copyrighted  works  from  the  1930s  with  public 
domain works from the 1910s and 1920s reveals that far more public domain 
works than copyrighted works are currently distributed to the public, and generally 
at  a  somewhat  lower  price.  Twice  as  many  books  published  in  1920s  (and 
therefore in the public domain) are in print today compared with books published 
in 1930s. 
Furthermore,  from  a  dynamic  efficiency  perspective  maintaining  the  exclusive 
property rights of an inventor for her inventions means a slowdown of innovation 
(the process of transforming inventions into innovation in manufacturing process   47 
and introducing new products) and thus a slowdown in growth and progress.  For 
example, a firm that has exclusivity in a new technology in production will delay 
the  actual  introduction  of  this  technology  in  accordance  with  its  sole  profit 
maximizing calculations.  This, in turn, may slowdown the innovation efforts of 
its competitors. 
 
4. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The incentive paradigm had been the main Law and Economics paradigm for the 
analysis of intellectual property. It is founded upon the principles of teleological 
moral  theory  which  can  be  accommodated  within  the  US  constitutional 
framework for IP law which vested Congress with the power to “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (Article 
8 of the US constitution). Its starting point is the identification of information as a 
public good, which means a market failure. Free and competitive market will not 
produce or will under-produce information because of its non-excludable nature. 
Thus,  central  intervention  is  required,  and  the  optimal  way  for  intervention 
according to the incentives paradigm is by intellectual property rights. However, 
informational goods as public goods are also non-rival, and this means that once 
these  goods  are  produced,  economic  efficiency  would  seek  their  maximized 
usage.  This is the reason that intellectual property rights are limited in scope and 
time and contain various exemptions and exceptions.   
 
This paper examined critically several of the premises of the incentives paradigm 
(are  monitory  incentives  really  needed  for  creative  activity?)  and  discussed 
several alternative mechanisms to generate such incentives, emphasizing that IP 
rights  are  only  one  among  various  substitute  mechanisms.  One  of  the  major 
disadvantages  of  IPR  is  the  paradox  they  generate:  those  creations  that  have 
substitutes will be priced at near free economic market price, so perhaps the IP   48 
protection is not needed for their creation in the first place.  Granting IP rights to 
those  creations  that  are  really  path  breaking,  unique  and  essential  will  create 
monopolistic power of the creator and thus will not get to the wide population that 
is  in  real  need  for  them.  We  showed,  further,  that  rendering  exclusivity  in 
informational  goods  gives  right-holders  strategic  advantages  in  informational 
markets  and  allow  them  to  exercise  market  control  far  beyond  the  carefully 
defined list of rights and the economic purposes they were design to serve. We 
also examined several possible objects of incentives and different groups that they 
serve:  incentives  to  create  versus  incentives  to  disseminate  and  distribute, 
incentives to create versus incentives to disclose, and incentives to create and 
innovate versus incentives to improve. Each of these targets, activities and groups 
justifies a different form and scope of IP rights in order to secure the desirable 
incentives, if needed at all. We paid a special attention to new technologies, which 
generate also new modes of production and distribution and, therefore, question 
the suitability of the traditional IP regime to this changing environment.  Finally, 
we  emphasized  that  from  a  dynamic  efficiency  perspective  IPR  might  be  the 
worst tool to generate incentives. 
 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  incentives  paradigm,  due  to  its  recognition  in  the  two 
opposing  consequences  of  propertisizing  informational  goods  that  have  to  be 
mitigated and optimized, cannot be characterized as a-priori pro propertization 
and anti commons or anti public domain. The question it should have highlighted 
is the right extent of IP, and by derivation of the public domain, or the right 
mixture that will maximize society’s wealth or wellbeing. However, the phrasing 
of this question in the context of the contemporary policy debates leaves two 
important factors that were not addressed by the core model – the definition of 
society for which we are seeking to maximize welfare and the definition of a time 
frame for such maximization (which is a different way to distinguish between 
static and dynamic efficiency) – in addition to the more conventional measuring 
problems. These two factors are less crucial (but not absent) in the analysis of old 
property  –  tangibles  and  land  -  as  physical  property  is  connected  to  specific   49 
territory, save exceptional externalities; and it usually has a relatively long-term 
value.  Informational  products  have  no  geographical  barriers  (or  minor 
geographical  barriers  of  language)  and  their  term  of  value  can  change 
significantly  from  news  items  with  momentary  value  to  major  scientific 
breakthroughs or major ideas with a long term, even eternal, effect. In addition, 
the new property is mostly hypothetical or pre-creation and thus the impact of 
current IP laws is crucial for future creation of potential property.  
 
Indeed, the debate between the developing world countries and the industrialized 
world  regarding  patents  on  medications  exemplifies  the  two  crucial  factors  of 
territory  and  time  span.  If  the  departure  point  of  this  debate  is  incentives  to 
promote  efficiency  (even  when  phrased  in  terms  of  wealth  maximization)  the 
question of the unit for which we seek to maximize wealth is the first question to 
be asked. Should we maximize wealth for the traditional national state or for the 
whole world? This question is crucial when international treaties, such as TRIPS 
are deliberated. It is clear why American IP laws do not take into account their 
impact on the dying people in Africa. Similarly, it is clear why a country which is 
mainly an importer of intellectual creations, rather than a producer, will find it 
more efficient for its members to set a low degree of IP protection. But it is not 
clear why the American rules fit the global environment.  
 
Similarly, different time units for wealth maximization will have a significant 
impact  on  the  cost-benefit  analysis  of  propertization.  If,  for  example, 
maximization calculations are conducted on a momentary or short time span, than 
most  intellectual  property  ought  to  be  in  the  public  domain  –  the  price  of 
medications should be their marginal production cost, because the potential effect 
on future creation is not taken on board, as well as past incentives to create. If the 
time unit for such maximization is long, than the incentives to create should be 
taken on board. But how long should this time unit be? And how can we possibly 
predict  the  impact  of  today’s  regulation  on  future  creation,  especially  in  an   50 
environment in which technological progress (which itself depends on the current 
IP regulation) is so rapid? The growing pace of technological change decreases 
even  the  relevancy  of  the  few  empirical  studies  on  the  impact  of  IP  laws  on 
cultural and scientific progress. For the new property, therefore, the two questions 
– whose wealth we are seeking to maximize and what is the time frame for such 
maximization  –  become  highly  important.  The  lack  of  a  solid  analytical 
framework and empirical abilities to discuss these two variables – time and space 
- can be viewed as one of the reasons for the paradigmatic shift from incentives to 
pre-assumed  property.  The  easy  solution  taken  by  contemporary  Law  and 
Economics  literature  was  to  abandon  the  incentives  framework  altogether  and 
resort to the a-priori assumption that information is the property of its creator. 
 
This  paradigmatic  shift  was  facilitated  by  resorting  to  traditional  economic 
analysis of physical property, where Demsetz’ 1967 theory was a major anchor.  
The shift, however, overlooked various differences between physical property and 
information,  as  well  as  the  positive  (as  opposed  to  normative)  nature  of  the 
tragedy of the commons analysis. The incentives framework is a pure normative 
analysis, while the tragedy of the common emerged originally from a positive 
analysis.  In this sense, the tragedy of the commons framework for traditional 
property rights can be presented as creating an inner equilibrium between positive 
and normative analyses. Once central intervention is required in the information 
markets, such equilibrium cannot be envisaged. Intellectual property rights have 
to be established by lawmakers and their distributional effects expose them to 
manipulation by interests groups, social choice problems and other public choice 
obstacles.  Economic  analysis,  therefore,  cannot  predict  that  the  desirable 
(optimal)  solutions  will  be  indeed  implemented  on  the  bases  of  the  same 
fundamental assumptions of the Law and Economics framework, especially the 
assumption  of  rational,  self  maximizing,  behavior.  This  point  is  especially 
important in the context of the debates about the current expansion of IPR laws. 
While the supporters of IP extension and enlargement comprise relatively small 
and powerful groups of people which are likely to get well organized (because the   51 
costs  of  organization  will  be  lower  than  the  expected  benefits  from  such 
organization),  the  supporters  of  a  greater  public  domain  encompass  many 
individuals whose individual gains from organization is likely to be smaller than 
the immense organization costs; thus their likelihood to influence the decision-
makers will be much lower than that of the IP lobbies. The legislative results, 
therefore, are likely to reflect a bias (in terms of the optimal point according to the 
Law and Economic theories) towards the pro-IP camp. 
 
Applying the propriety framework to information raises additional and, to my 
mind, fundamental questions regarding the meaning of property right, in general, 
and whether the justifications for the legal definition of this right when tangibles 
or land are involved are intact when we apply it to informational and intellectual 
creations. These questions have not been addressed yet by Law and Economics, 
and I want to conclude this piece by placing them on the discussion table.  
 
Full property right, or ownership, is an established legal concept, but, in fact, this 
right is an abstract concept, which includes a bundle of particular rights related to 
its  object.    The  five  main  components  of  private  ownership  are  access, 
withdrawal,  management,  exclusion  and  alienation  (Ostrom,  2000).  In  other 
words, when the law recognizes the right of property (ownership) it implicitly 
acknowledges different exclusive rights of the owner to access the property, to use 
it, to manage it, to exclude others from using it, to transfer it to others and to 
destroy the property. All the economic benefits that result from these activities 
belong to the owner.   There is no obvious reason to consider automatically the 
whole bundle of rights as one legal concept. 
 
Indeed, the rulings of American courts regarding natural resources, such as oil, 
gas  and  waters,  developed  a  more  complex  allocation  of  rights.  For  example, 
courts ruled that, while individuals have the right to drill on their private property   52 
and that the retrieved oil is owned by them in the sense of usage, transfer and 
exclusion (although its source is a common pool below all the private properties 
around), they are not allowed to alienate the oil and will be liable in damages for 
doing so (Epstein, 1985, p. 221). This ruling, in fact, creates a right that includes 
exclusive access and withdrawal, common management and no right to alienation. 
This is an exception to the general perception of full private property as thick and 
integral  concept.  Correspondingly,  Elinor  Ostrom  won  The  Noble  Prize  for 
Economics,  among  other  writings,  for  showing  the  efficiency  of  common 
ownership  of  natural  resources,  in  opposition  to  the  common  wisdom  of  the 
tragedy of the commons. It is possible that transaction costs were the main reason 
in the past not to break up the concept of property into its different components, 
or rather to group those rights under a common legal title in the first place.  In the 
new  information  environment  transaction  costs  are  significantly  lower  (Elkin-
Koren  and  Salzberger,  1999).  More  sophisticated  and  fine  tuned  enforcement 
measures  are  available  by  innovative  technologies.  It  might  be  an  interesting 
exercise to examine the justification of each of these components separately and 
their optimal degree of propertization. For example, the optimal duration of each 
of these rights might be different. While restrictions on access are the most heavy-
handed measure vis-à-vis the implications on the flow of ideas and the sources for 
new creations, management, exclusion and alienation are less harmful. On the 
other hand, from the point of view of the individual incentives to create, allowing 
greater access (for example by a wide definition of fair use and its extension 
beyond copyright) might pose a minor disincentive to create in comparison to 
allowing management, transfer or alienation. 
 
The broadening of the objects of traditional property to informational objects has 
an effect also on the old property. Let us assume that the government changes the 
designation of particular common land into private property. This piece of land is 
subsequently  purchased  by  an  individual  who  builds  on  it  an  architectural 
masterpiece.  This new building is privately owned in the sense that no one can 
enter the building, use it, sell it or eliminate it, save its private owner or under her   53 
permission.    But  the  pleasure  of  viewing  the  building  for  the  rest  of  the 
community, the inspiration it creates, its contribution to future architectural plans 
should be regarded according to the new paradigm also as part of the owner’s 
property. Why should we distinguish between the economic benefits an owner is 
entitled to when a physical object is their source, and the equivalent benefits when 
their source is an idea or non-physical creation? The new architecture masterpiece 
can be the source for new ideas in architecture, the source of inspiration of poets 
and writers and, in general, a source for utility enhancement for members of the 
community  and  even  the  cause  for  an  increase  in  the  monetary  values  of  the 
private properties of the neighbors. All these benefits cannot be claimed, under 
present legal doctrine, by the private owner of the new building, thus they are 
things,  which  belong  to  the  public  domain.  This  example  demonstrates  that 
property is not necessarily the antonym of the public domain, because it is very 
possible that had this piece of land been kept in common ownership or declared 
res nullius, everyone could have made any physical use of it, but the total welfare 
or utility of the community would have been lower to the total welfare for the 
community even after the deduction of the value of the private owner.  
 
From a Law and Economics perspective (defined broadly on the bases of utility 
maximization, or narrowly on the bases of wealth maximization), property rights 
are a mechanism to increase the total utility/wealth of the population and in this 
path we can resort to Demsetz and his externalities analysis of the emergence of 
property rights in land or to the public goods analysis of the incentives model, and 
portray the public domain as comprising also positive externalities from private 
property.  However, if we expand the traditional objects of property to include all 
economic benefits that can be extracted from them, the result would be a decrease 
in  total  utility  or  wealth  not  only  in  the  traditional  realm  of  IP  but  also  as  a 
consequence of indirect modifications of the extent of property rights in tangibles 
and land. Under a restricted definition of IP, in the framework of the traditional 
Law and Economics paradigm, the public domain, an important source for new 
creations and thus for welfare enhancement, cannot be regarded as an antonym of   54 
private  property.  As  our  example  above  shows,  under  this  framework, 
propertization or commodification can in fact enlarge the public domain. Under 
the propriety paradigm, which pre-assumes that everything of value is an object of 
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